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THE SENATORIAL CAREER OF WILLIAM P. FRYE
%
Ronald F. Banks
An Abstract of the Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of 
Arts (in History). June, 1958.
William Pierce Frye served as a Senator from Maine for a period 
of thirty years, 1881=1911. During this time the United States passed 
from a nation still binding the wounds of the Civil War to a nation 
which achieved the status of a world power. Frye was an active 
participant in this growth and as much as any single individual, 
symbolized the United States of this period.
Like his country, Frye was often impulsive as his opposition to 
the Bayard-Chamberlain negotiations illustrates. He was an artist at 
"twisting the lion's tail" and never failed to exploit this ability 
xdienever the position of his country or of himself could be enhanced 
at the expense of Great Britain.
The Senator was impressed with the greatness of his country, a 
greatness, which to him, was characterized by its bigness in industrial 
production rather than by its intellectual and cultural achievements.
An analysis of his efforts to preserve this greatness, as he conceived 
it, has been attempted by investigating his position on such issues as 
foreign commerce, the tariff, and the merchant marine.
It was Frye's contention that territorial acquisitions were of 
prime importance to the United States if this country were to maintain 
her greatness. He championed, indefatigably, the annexation of Cuba 
and Hawaii and several times advocated that the United States should 
seize Canada and "hold her against the world." It was Frye who was
personally responsible for the payment of twenty million dollars to 
Spain for the Philippine Islands in. the Treaty of Paris, 18$?8.
The Senator from Maine held positions of national significance.
He was a ranking member of the Senate Foreign P-elations Committee and 
as Chairman of the Committee on Commerce a subsidy to merchant vessels 
consumed much of his energies. For fifteen he was president pro- 
terapore of the senate and for five of those years served as acting 
Vice-President. From these positions he extended a profound influence 
on national policy. &n attempt to analyze the results of this influ­
ence has been the object of this thesis.
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INTRODUCTIOM
The year 1899 in Maine political history marks the zenith of the 
influence of her men on shaping national policies. "Maine was," in­
deed, as Joe Cannon observed, "the whole shooting match." Never be­
fore or since can one point to a time when as many important govern­
ment positions were held by Maine men. Only the Presidency was 
-eluding; the House being led by the capable Thomas B. Reed, Melville 
B. Fuller, originally a Maine native, served as Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, and William Pierce Frye was the president protempore of 
the Senate, and due to the death of Vice President Hobart was acting 
Vice President of the United States. In addition, Maine claimed the 
Secretary of the Navy, Long, and the Secretary of War, Alger, plus 
numerous ministerships and consulates.
Why positions as important politically came to these men is 
difficult to say. Seniority can explain Reed and Frye but even sen­
iority does not apply solely, since other public officials had, in a 
few cases, served as long. %  research has failed to disclose any 
logical explanation for this power except that Maine was considered 
politically strategic to Republican le aders of the day. Nevertheless, 
she represented only six votes in the electoral college and was con­
sidered a reasonably "safe state" that could be neglected during 
election years. Indeed, it was Maine which furnished many of the 
stump speakers for Republican campaigns in those years when such 
figures were an integral part of the electioneering machine.
Only three Maine political figures have been approached by the 
professional historian, namely, Fuller, Reed, and James G. Blaine. 
Others such as Charles Boutelle, Eugene Hale, Seth Milliken, and
iii
Frye have been neglected. This thesis proposes to shed some light on 
a career which is comparable in many ways to those which have already 
been publicized. Recording Frye's Senate career is a prodigious task. 
A man of his stature and forty years service in Congress deserves to 
be known and the author submits this very selective work as an at­
tempt, albeit inadequate, to give Frye his deserved place in the his­
tory of the United States. Also the question, was his work commensu­
rate with the time he took to accomplish his mission, is worthy of 
consideration.
CHAPTER I
FRYE'S EARLY LIFE AND WORK
William Pierce Frye was born September 2, 1831, in Lewiston, 
Maine. His parents, Colonel John and Mrs. Alice M. Frye, were pio­
neers of this town on the Androscoggin River. Colonel Frye was finan­
cially well-to-do for his day owning the controlling interest of the 
Lewiston Manufacturing Company which he helped found in 183U. The 
Colonel1s grandfather had been a high officer in the English army and, 
as was customary in colonial America, he had received a grant of land 
for his participation in the French and Indian Wars. Later, he became 
a general for the Colonials in the American Revolution, and subse­
quently he settled his grant and thereby founded the town of Fryeburg 
located in western Maine near the New Hampshire border,
William's father was an active politician. His title of Colonel 
was not a military rank but rather an honorary one conferred on him as 
a member of the Governor’s Council during the Civil War. In addition 
to being a councilman, he had previously served as selectman and town 
treasurer of Lewiston and was later elected state senator from 
Androscoggin County,
Few facts are known of William's boyhood. His grandson, William 
Frye White wrote a short and very selective family history, Lewiston 
Miniatures. From this study, which probably should be classified as 
family folklore and reminiscences, a general picture of Frye's youth 
can be drawn. William was sent to Bowdoin, says White, mainly because 
of his father's excellent financial condition. At Bowdoin, William 
was a "live wire" who probably partook of the prevailing college 
festivities, drinking, card playing, and roistering. He was admonish-
ed for his "indecorum" by the Dean several times and for his irrev­
erent excesses with the homely preachers of the day.
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Several other students on the Bowdoin campus at this time (l81;6- 
1850) were to make great contributions to -American history during and 
after the -American Civil War. Oliver Otis Howard and Melville B. 
Fuller are only two of the more conspicuous college associates of 
Frye. Despite his various diversions, he graduated from Bowdoin in 
1850, although in the third-quarter of his class which numbered only 
thirty-two.^ Later, he was honored with L.L.D.'s from Bowdoin and 
Bates and served on the Board of Directors of his alma mater.
From the Bowdoin campus, Frye went to Portland and studied law in 
the office of William Pitt Fessenden, the distinguished Maine senator 
and statesman. He was admitted to the bar after this apprenticeship 
and established, with a Mr. Came, a practice in Rockland, Maine.
In Rockland, he met Caroline Spear whom he married in 1852. 
William White related that Frye was persona non grata with the Spear 
family and was forced to meet Caroline clandestinely at the farm of a 
sympathetic neighbor.
In 185U, Frye and his family moved to Lewiston and familiar sur­
roundings. He entered into a partnership with a brother of William 
Pitt Fessenden. Frye was apparently a very capable lawyer; but he 
also began to show even greater political potential. Nelson Dingley,
editor of the Lewiston Journal, said that Frye's law office was the
2
center of Lewiston and Androscoggin County politics. 12
1. Charles Lingley, Dictionary of American Biography. Vol. 7, p.5l.
2. Edward N. Dingley, The Life and Times of Nelson Dingley, Jr.,
3
His first experience in the active political arena was as 
Register of Probate for Androscoggin County. From this position, he 
was elected to the state legislature where he served from 1861 to 
1862 and 1863 to 1867. In 1866 and 1867, he was elected mayor of 
Lewiston and from that office was elected Attorney-General of the 
state serving in that capacity for three years. One nineteenth cen­
tury author praised his record in this office and said, "Some of his 
prosecutions which he was called upon to conduct as prosecuting
officer were for capital offences celebrated in the annals of the
3
criminal cases of Maine."
Frye first ventured into national politics in 1871 as the repre­
sentative from Maine's second district to Congress. He had sought 
elevation to this seat both in 1862^ and in 1866^ but withdrew before 
the elections. In 1869, he made a third attempt and was defeated by
S.P. Morrill.^ His career of ten years in the national House is in­
teresting but not as noteworthy as his career in the Senate. He 
quickly established himself as an effective orator and, with Repre­
sentative Blaine, Hale, and Lynch, served both the Republican Party 
and the State of Maine well.
As a member of the Committee on Rules, he, with James Garfield 3*56
(Kalamazoo: Michigan, 1901), p. 36.
3. Jean Paul. Senator Frye of Maine, N.H. State Republican Committee 
(189U?), P. 16.
U. Dingley, 0£. cit., p. 65.
5. Ibid.. p. 83.
6. Ibid., p. 92.
and others revised and codified the rules of the House. He was to 
perform a similar revision as a member of the Senate. One of the more 
interesting episodes in Frye's life was his part in the investigation 
of James G. Blaine and the Little Rock Railroad - Mulligan letters 
scandal. Although Frye was not a parly to the scandal, it appears 
that he definitely had a copy of the famous (or infamous) Caldwell
g
Telegram and therefore must have known more than we can ever ascer­
tain. Some years later, Frye's involvement in this affair was to get 
him into a very discomforting position.
During the winter of 187U—75, Frye and Representative George Hoar
of Massachusetts were sent to Louisiana to investigate the legality of
q
the Kellogg government of that state.
Maty of Frye's speeches were directed at the English as his at­
tack on the Geneva award in 1876 would confirm. Unlike many of his 
colleagues, he believed that the freed negro should be reconstructed 
through education; he even made speeches demanding a pure ballot among 
whites and negroes. However, most of his stands were partisan and 
seldom, if ever, did he rise to statesman like qualities.
In the election of 1876, Frye and his colleague Representative 
Hale served as Blaine's campaign managers at the Republican National 
Convention. At this convention in Cincinnati, it was the famed free­
thinker Robert Ingersoll of Illinois who nominated Blaine. After 789
7. William Robinson, Life of Thomas B. Reed, (New York: Dodd and 
Mead, 1930), p. 65.
8. David Muzzey, James G. Blaine. (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1931:), 
p. 98.
9. George Hoar, Autobiography of 70 Years, (New York: Scribners;
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Ingersoll's eloquent address it was nearing darkness at the huge con­
vention hall. Frye, hoping to capitalize on the momentum from Inger- 
soll's oratory, asked that the lights be turned on in order to push 
for Blaine's nomination on the first ballot. His request was greeted 
with a chorus of "no's" which effectively eliminated any chance for a 
Blaine nomination. 10 Eventually Blaine supported Rutherford B. Hayes 
who went on to win from Samuel Tilden in the disputed election of 1876.
Whether Blaine expected favors from Hayes for his support is not 
entirely clear. However, he asked Hayes for the right to name one 
cabinet officer from the New England area.11 123*5 Blaine called on Hayes
at Senator Sherman's house to urge the President-Elect to appoint Frye 
12as attorney-general. Hayes refused but offered to appoint Eugene
13Hale. It was now Blaine's turn to decline since he wished to remove 
Frye as a rival of Hale. Blaine had wanted Hale to succeed Senator 
Hannibal Hamlin who was about to retire but Frye stood in the way.1^ 
Hayes noted in his diary that Blaine and Hamlin were both disgruntled 
and that "Blaine seemed to claim it (appointment of Frye), as a con­
dition of good relations with me ,"1^
1903), p. 79.
10. Muzzey, 0£. cit., p. 100.
11. Louis Hatch, Maine, A History, (New York: American Historical 
Society, 1919), Vol. II, p. 586.
12. Harry Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes and His America, (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 195U)7_ pTTIIFI
13. Hatch, o£. cit., p. 386.
lit. Ibid., p. 386.
15. Charles Williams, Ed., The Life of R.B. Hayes, (Ohio Arch. Soc.,
6
President Hayes' appraisal was correct. His refusal only antag­
onized the Maine senator. Blaine and the conservative wing of the 
party were very unhappy with Hayes' other cabinet appointments, 
particularly Carl Schurz;^ furthermore they publicly revealed their 
displeasure. On March 6, 1877, Blaine delivered a speech in the 
Senate which challenged a statement of policy made by Hayes in his in­
augural address. Blaine's intention was to force the President to
17appoint Frye to the cabinet. However, Hayes was not to be moved by 
this criticism and Maine still failed to gain a cabinet member. Frye 
returned to the House apparently unmoved by this incident.
While Frye and Hale were members of the House, Maine also had two 
nationally famous Senators in the upper house. One of these gentlemen 
Hannibal Hamlin had been a pillar of the Republican Party since his 
defection from the Democratic Party in 1856. He had served as 
Lincoln's Vice President during his first term and was subsequently 
elected a senator from Maine. The other gentleman, James 0. Blaine, 
had been Speaker of the House of Representatives and a prospective 
presidential candidate in 1876. Four years later, Blaine was again 
considered for the nomination. He was still in the national limelight 
because of his leadership of the Republican element which had recently 
and successfully forestalled a fusionist (Democrat and Greenback) 
attempt to prevent seating Republican legislators in his home state of 
Maine. Emerging from this battle victoriously, he was bent on getting 167
1928), Vol. II, p. 2k.
16. Ibid., p. 2k.
17. Ibid., p. 17.
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the nomination. To help him do this, he chose, as previously, Frye 
and Hale to serve as his campaign managers.
The anti-Blaine, pro-Grant forces were led by Roscoe Conkling,
1 ftSimon Cameron, and John Logan. The convention was pervaded by 
hostilities between Conkling and Blaine; the party had split into two 
irreconcilable factions. Perhaps Frye and Hale were too amateurish 
and provincial to handle the experienced Conkling otherwise Blaine 
might have received the nomination."*"^ Conkling rose to answer Frye on 
several occasions and always had complete control of the situation.
Once he humiliated Frye by answering him "in a way that was half sneer 
and half insult." Only once, when Frye seconded Blaine's nomination, 
did he display any of the poise and eloquence which in later years was 
to make him one of the most sought after campaign speakers of his time. 
Referring to Blaine's capable handling of the fusionist threat in 
Maine, he roused the convention to "tumultous cheering" by his de­
scription of the pilot who had safely brought to port the tempest- 
tossed ship, "the State of Maine."
Freighted with the precious principles of this Re­
public, with the rights of American citizenship, with 
the privileges guaranteed by the Constitution, she 
was battling the waves. The eyes of the whole nation 
were upon her. They beheld with intense anxiety the 
perils to which she was exposed. A true man was at 
the helm. Sagacious himself, he made even the foolish 
wise and courageous. He inspired "the timid. Strong, 
he strengthened the weak, calm, he restrained the 18920
18. Theodore Smith, James A. Garfield, Life and Letters, (New Haven: 
Yale Press, 1925), VoTT~IT7"pi 91:7̂
19. Ibid., p. 961.
20. Ibid., p. 970
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impetuous and brought the imperiled ship with the
precious cargo into the port of safety---. Take
that man, wise, stout, and brave, for your leader 
and he will surely bring you to safety and vic­
tory— -.n^-
The election of 1880 placed James Garfield in the White House,
He had received the nomination because of Blaine's willingness to join 
the Garfield forces in an attempt to keep Grant from being nominated. 
As a reward to Blaine, the President made the Maine senator his Sec­
retary of State,
A few months earlier, Senator Hamlin had finally resigned his 
seat. The legislature was responsible for the selection of his suc­
cessor and the two most prominent possibilities were Frye and Hale.
The situation of party conflict which Blaine had feared in 1876 when 
he had asked Hayes to appoint Frye to a cabinet post, now presented 
itself. Hale had lost his House seat in the Greenback revolution of 
1878 and was now retired. Frye, on the other hand, had retained his 
seat and would probably become the next speaker of the House. Despite 
the efforts of Frye's supporters, the senate seat was given to Hale 
because Frye had a place in Washington; also Blaine would soon resign
his senate seat to become the Secretary of State vacating his seat for 
22Frye. Indeed, in order to discourage an open battle for his seat, 
Blaine prematurely announced that he was to become the Secretary of 
State much to the disgust of Garfield.^ On March 15, 1881, Fjye was 213
21. Muzzey, 0£. cit., p. l5?.
22. Leon Richardson, Life of William Chandler, (New York: Dodd and 
Mead, 19U0), p. 261*.
23. Hatch, o£. cit.. p. 619
duly elected to the Senate as he had been promised and served there 
continuously until his death in 1911, a period of thirty years.
9
Blaine's concern for Frye is understandable. As has been 
shown, Frye had been Blaine's campaign manager in 1876 and 1880 as 
well as one of his most stalwart supporters during the Little Rock - 
Fort Smith scandal. Moreover, his eloquence in seconding Blaine's 
nomination had heightened the presidential aspirant's obligation to 
his fellow partisan.
On assuming his new duties as senator, Frye was to continue much 
of the program which formerly had been championed by Blaine. One 
cause espoused, which will presently be considered, was the Bayard- 
Chamberlain fiasco which succeeded in establishing Frye as one of the 
more powerful men in the Republican Party.
FRYE AND THE BAYARD - CHAMBERLAIN NEGOTIATIONS
The majority of diplomatic historians agree that, between 1783-
1911, the North Atlantic fisheries question vexed American Secretaries
of State more persistently than any other single issue.
Since John Adams had salvaged fishing rights for New England in
the Treaty of Paris, 1783, and subsequent negotiations had secured
United States' position, New Englanders had depended heavily on the
products derived from the seas. Therefore, any attempt by the British
to negate the hard fought concessions to the advantage of Canada was
bound to arouse the indignation of New England congressmen.
By the Convention of 1818, American fishermen were allowed to take
forever "fish along certain portions of the southern, western, and
northern coasts of Newfoundland, and along the coasts, bays, harbours,
and creeks from Mount Joly --  through the Streights of Belleisle."^
Also, the United States received the liberty "to forever dry and cure
fish in the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks" of the southern
coast of Newfoundland, and the coast of Labrador. However, the most
important provision of the Convention agreement and that which pertains
to Frye’s life is the so-called "three marine mile clause." By this
clause the United States renounced the right to cure, dry, and take
fish within "three marine miles of any coasts, bays, creeks, or har-
2
bours" of Canada except for those previously cited. In addition, the
1. Charles C. Tansill, Canadian-American Relations 1875-1911. (New 
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 19b3), p.L.
2. Ibid., p.5.
Chapter II
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United States was permitted to enter the ports of Canada to obtain 
water "and for no other purpose whatever."^
In 1853} Canada^attempting to circumvent the more restrictive 
clauses of the Convention of 1818, seized a number of American ships 
off the Canadian coast. Matthew Perry was sent to protect the American 
vessels. Subsequently, England, anxious to avoid trouble, agreed to 
negotiate the Treaty of Washington in 185U, also known as the Marcy- 
ELgin agreement.
Under the terms of this treaty, the United States received in­
shore fishing rights denied her by the Convention of 1818. Also, 
Canadian vessels were permitted to fish along the shores of the United 
States down to the 36th parallel, which includes Chesapeake Bay.^
More important to both countries as a whole were the reciprocity 
arrangements concerning agricultural products of the two countries.
The Marcy-ELgin agreement continued in force through the American 
Civil War. However, because Canada showed sympathy toward the Confed­
erate States of America and increasing animosity toward reciprocity- 
agreements, the United States announced that the Marcy-Elgin Agreement 
would be terminated March 17, 1866,^
The termination of this treaty deprived American vessels of the 
right to fish inside the three-mile limit, thus the status of the 
fisheries question reverted to the agreement reached by the Convention
3. Ibid.
ll. Thomas A. Bailey, A  Diplomatic History of the American People, 
(Hew York: F.S. Crofts and Co., 1952), p. 277.
5. Tansill, o£. cit.. p. 8.
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of 1818. As a result, Canada passed additional retalitory legislation 
which caused relations to worsen between the two neighbors.
During this time Hamilton Fish, Grant's Secretary of State, began 
negotiating the Alabama Claims with Great Britain. As these negotia­
tions proceeded, the fisheries question once again reared its ugly 
head and, as a result, in a new Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, 
provisions were made for -toe settlement of the fisheries question as 
well as other pressing diplomatic problems.
Under articles eighteen through twenty-four, the United States 
was granted all rights she had enjoyed by the Convention of 1818, and 
the added right to "take fish of every kind, except shell fish, on the 
coasts and shores, and in the bays, harbours, and creeks, of the prov­
inces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick -—  Prince Edward Is­
land" providing that its subjects do not damage private property or
6
interfere with British fishermen. To compensate for this loss,
Canadian fishermen were authorized to fish along the eastern seacoast
of the United States as far south as the thirty-ninth parallel. To
further compensate for what Canada felt to be an unfair treaty, a
commission was appointed to determine an amount of money to be paid
7
Canada for this liberal grant of her fishing territory.
The commission met at Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 1877. It was com­
posed of three members, two being favorable to British interests and
6. W.M. Mallory, Treaties. Conventions, etc., (Washington: 1910), 
Vol. 1, p, 708.
7. Ibid., p. 709.
13
the other favorable to -American interests.^ This body awarded to
9
Canada the sum of $3,300,000. It should be noted, however, that Mr. 
Kellogg, the American commissioner, refused to concur with the major­
ity opinion. Kellogg's refusal indicates the dissatisfaction with 
which some Americans, especially New Englanders, viewed the award.^
On November 21, 1878, the payment was made under protest with the 
United States declaring that it could not accept the findings of the 
commission but would pay the sum to maintain "good faith in treaties
and the security and value of arbitration between nations-- Thus
the fisheries question that many hoped was permanently settled by the 
Treaty of Washington in 1871 was only temporarily solved, and even 
then only in a spirit of ill will and mutual distrust.
Senator Frye was extremely dissatisfied with the Treaty of Wash­
ington and the decision of the Halifax Commission. On January 10, 
1883, he proposed a joint resolution in the Senate which asked for the 
termination of articles eighteen to twenty-six and thirty of the 
Treaty of Washington. These articles pertained to the fisheries
question; essentially Frye sought the abrogation of existing treaty
12arrangements with Canada.
Congress passed Frye's resolution and gave the required two years
8. Ellis P. Oberholtzer, A History of the United States Since the 
Civil War, (New forks McMillan Co., 1931J, Vol. IV, p. UsB.
9. House Miscellaneous Documents, "The Halifax Award" (Washington: 
G.P.O. 1893-9U), Vol. 39, p. 7U5.
10. Ibid., p. 7U5-U6.
11. Ibid., p. 733.
12. Congressional Record, U7 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 10lfLo
Ill
notice to Canada abrogating the clauses which guaranteed American
rights to inshore fishing, bait purchasing, and transshipment of
13
cargoes within Canadian waters.
The United States had numerous reasons for wishing to abrogate 
the fisheries articles of the treaty. The Halifax award had been un­
popular in the United States. Also, the fact that under the Treaty, 
Canadian fish had been allowed to enter this country duty free had 
annoyed New Englanders. Canada was benefiting more than the United 
States financially, due to the absence of ary tariff and this caused 
envy among many members of the fisheries industry. Incidents like the 
Fortune Bay affair in 1878 added greatly to the discontent. In this 
affair American sailors, engaged in taking herring in Fortune Bay, New­
foundland, were attacked by natives who destroyed one of the American 
seines and forced them to stop fishing. Such occurrences were too 
common to be ignored.^
Officially the Treaty of Washington was to expire July 1, 1885, 
and therefore the pertinent provisions derived from it would become 
void on that date. One consequence of this termination would be the 
reversion of the fisheries agreements to the Convention of I8l8. This 
change was the desire of the fishing interests. Consequently, on 
January 31, 1885, President Arthur issued a proclamation warning Amer­
ican fishermen of the impending expiration of present privileges en-
15joyed under the treaty. However, Grover Cleveland's election in the
13. Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1933),
p. Uo5. .............
llj. Oberholtzer, oj>. cit., p. bh7-kh8.
15. Tansill, og. cit., p. 13.
15
autumn of 1881* abruptly changed the status of affairs. c: ^1 : ';aly.
Unlike President Arthur, the Democratic Cleveland was guided by a 
sense of national rather than sectional interest. He believed in low­
ering the high tariff walls erected by the protectionists and was 
particularly determined to improve relations with Canada. Before 
Cleveland assumed office, President Arthur had rejected as "impracti­
cal" Canadian offers to extend the terms of the Treaty of Washington 
until January 1, 1886.^ This rejection by a "lame duck" President 
and Cleveland's desire to improve relations with Canada confused the 
fisheries question even more.
On March 6, 1885, Thomas F. Bayard assumed the office of Secre­
tary of State for President Cleveland} he was forced to deal with the 
problem immediately. The New England fishing interests, he felt, had 
to be content with the program of the preceding Administration, since 
they had been primarily responsible for the impending abrogation of 
the treaty provisions. However, would the fishing interests then be 
satisfied with the rights granted them by the Convention of 1818, 
which was to be re-instated on July 1, 1886? No provisions were made 
for the purchase of bait. Fishing vould be prohibited within "three 
marine miles of any coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors" of Canada except 
"along certain portions of the southern, western, and northern coasts
of Newfoundland-- and most restricting of all, Yankee fishermen
would have no right of transshipment of fish over Canadian land into 
the United States. 167
16. Ibid., p. 13.
17. Mallory, 0£. cit.. p. 631.
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Possibly, Secretary Bayard foresaw that the act of abrogation had
caused more harm than benefits for the fishing industry. He may have
thought that New England did not realize the implications of their
decision. Surely, she did not think Canada would extend the rights of
transshipment, fishing within the three mile limit, and the curing and
drying of fish, particularly, since Canadian fish could not now enter
the United States free of duty. Bayard soon discovered the answers to
his questions when he accepted an extension of the terms of the Treaty
of Washington offered by Canada, an extension that Arthur had rejected.
The extension was to be, singly, a modus vivendi until more satisfac-
1 fttory arrangements could be made.
Secretary Bayard found that any postponement of the tariff charges
on Canadian fish would not be tolerated by the New England fishing
industry. Talk circulated that every fisherman along the New Jin gland
10
coast considered rising to arms if the tariff charges were delayed.
As diplomatic correspondence between Bayard and Canadian officials 
was exchanged, it became clear that no arrangement could be consum­
mated along the lines of reciprocity. Indeed, it was doubtful if any
20satisfactory arrangement could be negotiated.
This fear by the fishermen is more meaningful when one considers 
the general distrust of the Administration held by these interests.
They feared that the first Democratic President in twenty-four years 18920
18. Tansill, o£. cit., p. 18.
19. Ibid., p. 1 7.
20. Ibid., p. 19.
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wished to negotiate a treaty designed to allow Canadian fish to enter 
the United States duty free. In view of President Cleveland's 
public utterances, there was justification for such a fear. Cleveland, 
in his message to Congress December 8, 1885, included a recommendation 
for an appointment of a commission empowered to negotiate a settlement
upon a "just, equitable, and honorable basis" of the entire fisheries 
22questxon.
Senator Frye with his colleagues, Edmunds of Vermont, and Hoar of 
Massachusetts assumed the championship of the New England fisheries. 
Hoar and Edmunds, like Frye, were Senate types. Republican in their 
politics and partisan in their views toward the Democratic party, this 
triumvirate was high protectionist and vehemently opposed to conces­
sions to Canadian fish products. They remembered the Halifax Commis­
sion only too well, and were not pleased with its decision.
On January 5, 1886, less than a month after Cleveland's message 
to Congress, the war between the executive and the legislative branches 
commenced. On that date Frye introduced into the Senate a resolution 
requesting the Secretary of State to transmit "ary and all correspond­
ence and information in the custody of the State Department relative to
the extension of certain fishing rights and privileges under the Treaty
pq
of Washington from July 1, 1885 to January 1886." The resolution, as 
was customary, was agreed to unanimously.
Two weeks later on January 18, 1886, Senator Frye introduced 213
21. Ibid., p. 21.
22. Ibid.. p. 20.
23. Congressional Record, 1x9 Cong., 1 Sess., p. U03
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another resolution which answered Cleveland's request for a commission:
"-- Whereas the fishing rights were settled for ten
years by a commission appointed under the Treaty of 
Washington at a cost of $5,500,000 paid in money 
and a remission of duties amounting in the ten years 
to about $6,000,000 more, 
and
Whereas the effect of the terms agreed upon by 
the said commission was further an increase in the 
Canadian fishing fleet of five-hundred vessels and 
of ten-thousand seamen, with a corresponding de­
crease in our own fleet and sailors, without any 
appreciable benefits to the people of the United 
States: Therefore, be it resolved by the Senate of 
the United States, that in the opinion of the 
Senate the appointment of a commission clothed with . 
such powers ought not to be provided for by Congress.
A discussion followed this resolution. Senator Morgan of Alabama,
a member of the Foreign Relations Committee with Frye, argued that the
modus vivendi was simply a temporary arrangement.^ Frye answered
that the British Minister had requested a commission, not the fisher-
26
men who were satisfied. Contemptuously, he said that New England 
had enough of commissions to settle fisheries problems, "I say that 
the United States paid $15,000,000 without ever receiving one single
27
cent in return." He continued.
"I remember that in the Treaty of 1783, Great 
Britain conceded to us the right to fish on the 
Grand Banks and Banks of Newfoundland. Wonderful 
magnamity on the part of Great Britain! Not one 
of those banks was within 25 miles of the British 
possessions and running from that to 150 miles...,
Why did she not concede us the right to breathe *256
2lu Ibid., p. 703.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27 Ibid
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the air of heaven?"^
With his own brand of logic, Frye continued his vehement verbal
attack on the administration and the idea of a commission. He argued
that the fishermen did not use the inshore fishing banks because the
fish had shifted feeding grounds and the only reason Great Britain
desired a commission was to "get five and a half millions of dollars
29out of us literally for nothing." Thinking, realistically, of Great
Britain's need for American friendship, he further demanded that "we
use a get tough policy." Such a policy would not endanger the United
States; Great Britain could not afford to alienate the United States
since, "there never was a country in the history of the wide world so
under a mortgage to keep the peace with us as Great Britain is today.
30Neither they nor we seek any war.
Senator Morgan offered a different explanation; he retorted that
because the first commission failed, it was no reason to indict a new 
31
one. Morgan also insinuated that, perhaps, the duty on fish had 
something to do with Frye's reasoning. Frye persistently maintained, 
despite Morgan --- "that we desire nothing and therefore we must in­
evitably be the loser by a c o m m i s s i o n . H e  added later that he did 
not wish an increase on the tariff and admonished Great Britain to 
"let us, for Heavens sake alone; —  we can take care of ourselves."33 289*31
28. Ibid., p. 703.
29. Ibid.
3°. Ibid., p. 70U.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 705.
33. Ibid., p. 708.
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Much comment ensued because of this move of the Republican Senator 
from Maine. The modus vivendi had lapsed January 1, 1886, as had been 
agreed and Canada could be expected to enforce any violations of the 
Convention of 1818 to force the United States to negotiate. This 
possibility and its inherent dangers were appreciated by the State 
Department"54 but not by the New England fishing interests and their 
spokesmen. One Maine newspaper applauded Frye's efforts and hoped that 
the resolution would "have the effect to cause the Senate to see this 
question in its true light and prevent the sacrifice of the interests 
of American fishermen to the greed and cunning of British diplomacy."^
While the Senate was engaged in other business, Nelson Dingley, 
Jr., Maine's Representative from the second district, was mustering 
support for Frye's resolution in the House. Dingley presented a number 
of memorials from citizens and organizations within his constituency 
supporting Frye's resolution. They based their opposition, as did 
Dingley, on the assumption that the commission would allow Canadian 
fish into United States ports duty free, an assumption that later 
proved to be incorrect.
Because both the Senate and House appeared to be averse to the 
idea of a commission, Canada had commenced an illiberal enforcement of 
the Convention of 1818. She also claimed to have passed legislation 
which prohibited American fishermen from buying bait in Canadian ports 
despite the fact that Canadians benefited from these transactions as *356
3iw Tansill, o£. cit., p. 2h.
35. Kennebec Journal, January 20, 1886, p. b. Hereafter K.J.
36. Ibid.. January 30, 1886. See also Dingley, 0£. cit., p. 266-267
21
much as Americans did.-^ Thus, American shipowners were threatened 
with prosecutions for violating the Convention of 1818 and the recently- 
passed legislation prohibiting the purchase of bait.
While the House was debating a proposal similar to Frye's and 
Canada was passing legislation, the Senate twice refused to act on 
Frye's resolution. Finally, on April 5, 1886, Frye introduced a re­
port by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee embodying the substance 
of his earlier resolution.'® He also read a resolution adopted by the 
Fishing Exchange of Portland which advocated sending armed vessels in­
to the Atlantic to protect American fishing vessels from the molesta- 
tions of Canadian authorities, ' 7 The Portland Exchange request had 
been prompted by the refusal of Canada to allow United States' fisher­
men to buy bait as guaranteed by the Convention of 1818. Frye main­
tained that Americans had a right to go into any Canadian port, except 
for purposes of "piracy or for fishing within the three mile limit.
He pointed out that Canadian vessels had frequently been permitted to 
enter Portland and Gloucester to obtain provisions. Frye ended his 
speech with a warning that if one American vessel was seized by 
Canadian officials he would introduce a bill "to close the United 
States' ports against all British colonial fishing, freight, and pas- 3789
37. Tansill, 0£. cit.. p. 20. David Wells reported the pitiful con­
ditions under which Newfoundlanders lived and their dependency on 
this source of income,
38. Cong. Record. 1+9 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 3110.
39. Ibid.
1+0. I b i d . ,  p .  3 1 1 1
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senger vessels ... until Canada lifted her restrictions upon us,"^- 
On April 9, 1886, the original resolution by the Foreign Rela­
tions Committee was re-introduced. This time, Frye appealed to broad 
national interests for support of the measure rather than to his own 
sectional colleagues. He reasoned that "unobstructed without bounty 
or subsidy ... there is no reason why our fishing fleet shall not, in
ten years, number 15>,000 vessels, manned by 200,000 -- sailors."^2
Frye failed to mention the fact that this would aid Maine more than 
the rest of the country. His policy was to destroy the Canadian fish- 
eries by closing United States' markets to her. ^
The basic problem was how could the United States keep Canadian 
fish from entering the country. "Is there any good reason why she 
/Canada/ should have it /the U.S. market/?" asked Frye. "Our fisher­
men will be sailors in our next war. Why then should these men be 
selected for sacrifice, and their rights be surrendered to the tender 
mercies of British diplomacy?"^ Frye's answer, as always, was for a 
higher tariff on Canadian fish; a tariff which he had denounced in 
January when he introduced the resolution originally.^
With Dingley leading a successful battle in the House, Maine was 
well represented in its fight to revive the fishing and shipbuilding 
industries. On April 13, 1886, Frye's resolution, as embodied in the
hi. Ibid.. P. 3307
h2. Ibid.
Ii3. Ibid.. P. 3308
iUi. Ibid., P. 3313
U5. Ibid.. P. 708.
23
Committee on Foreign Relations' resolution, passed the Senate by a
vote of thirty-five to ten. Senator Morgan one of the more outspoken
antagonists of the New Ehgland Nationalism voted for the measure.
To Secretary Bayard this debate by the Senate was a "mere blowing
of fish horns" for partisan reasons.^ However, the real difficulties
were yet to come. On May 7, 1886, the American vessel David J , Adams
was seized by Canadians in Digby Basin. Bayard immediately protested
•this act as unjustified and admonished that serious consequences might
arise if such seizures continued.^ Especially significant was
Bayard's reasoning in this case. He said that American fishermen did
not want to dry or cure fish on the interdicted coasts. He pointed
out that bait was no longer needed to fish inside the three mile limit
and, hence, there could be no possible justification for the seizure
) ft
under the Convention of 1818. This analysis had a striking sim­
ilarity to the position that Frye had been presenting since 188$.
Despite British sympathy with the American stand and an apparent 
desire to settle the issue, the Canadians continued to seize American 
vessels. Bayard was disturbed over the David J, Adams affair and his 
concern increased when he learned that the case was to be tried in a 
Canadian vice-admiralty court. He appointed two men, William Putnam of
Portland, Maine and George W. Biddle of Philadelphia, to represent the
k 9
United States in the litigation. Both men were distinguished lawyers
U6. Tansill, 0£. cit.. p. 26.
1+7. Ibid.. p. 28.
1+8. Ibid., p. 29.
U9. Ibid., p. 29-30.
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and authorities on international law. ' ’0
Putnam reported to Bayard on June h, 1886, that the Canadians had 
acted on very inconsequential charges which could easily have been 
over-looked. Putnam was also unable to discover the laws which alleg- 
edly prohibited the -Americans from purchasing domestic bait. At the 
same time Senate Republicans increased the tempo of their attack on the 
Secretary of State. Bayard was now in a position which demanded posi­
tive action. One possible recourse was the use of force; Secretary of 
the Navy, W.C. Whitney was making preparations to send a fleet into
Canadian waters and the use of this fleet might persuade Canada to
52withdraw her orders to seize American vessels.
Frye introduced, as he had warned, an amendment to the Dingley 
shipping bill to exclude Canadian vessels from United States' ports 
until such time as Canada would stop seizing vessels.^ The amendment 
quickly passed the Senate and was agreed to by the House. Although one 
New York paper asked for moderation until all means of peaceful adjust­
ment proved ineffective,'’̂  Maine newspapers supported Frye's proposal
55and recommended any action which would procure "justice?
On May 27 the resolution passed the House as a rider to the
50. Ibid., p. 31.
51. Letter from Putnam to Bayard quoted in Tansill, 0£. cit., p. 36.
52. Ibid., p. 39.
53. Cong. Record, U9 Cong., 1 Sess., p. U572.
5U. New York Times, May 18, 1886, p. U/l. Hereafter N.Y.T.
55. Bangor Whig and Courier, May 19, 1886, p. 2, also, K.J., May 19,
1886,t h t :
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Dingley bill. The New York Times argued that the high tariff was the 
real issue involved and questioned how this resolution was to be im­
plemented,^
Congressional action had displayed a lack of confidence in Secre­
tary Bayard’s efforts to exhaust all peaceful means. In July, Port­
land fishermen threatened to boycott Canadian goods and demanded that
57Frye's proposal be implemented. On July 25, the Senate resolved 
that the Committee on Foreign Relations investigate the "rights of 
American fishing vessels within the North American possessions of the 
Queen of Sreat Britain, and whether any rights of such vessels have 
been violated...." Senators Frye, £dmunds, and Saulsbury were appoint­
ed to the sub-committee to begin its interrogation September 30,
1886.56 78
Between July 25 and September 30, the stage of the controversy 
shifted from the halls of Congress to the "stumps" of the Maine woods. 
The Congressional and state elections were to be held in September and 
Frye, a great campaigner, participated to insure Republican seats even 
though his own seat was not at stake. Blaine was also an active par­
ticipant in the off-year election, primarily, as titular head of his 
party, but also, to keep his name before the nation's voters in prep­
aration for the presidential election of 1888. The Kennebec Journal 
from August to September 16, recorded the schedule of addresses to be 
made. From August 13 to September 21, Frye delivered a speech every
56. N.Y.T.. May 28, 1886, p. H.
57. Ibid.. July 20, 1886, p. 1.
58. Senate Documents. 56 Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 231, Vol. 5, p. 631.
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day except Sundays. He appeared frequently on the platform with Reed, 
Blaine, and such national Republican leaders as McKinley and Allison, 
The participants, including Frye, concentrated on the fisheries 
"sell out" by the administration and the usual Republican positions on 
the tariff, commerce, and the treasury surplus. On August 21, Frye 
delivered an address at Houlton, Maine, which harmed Blaine more than 
it aided him. Referring to the Mulligan Letters and the Little Rock 
scandal, Frye said in his usual descriptive style,
"You take a magnificent bridal dress with its 
ribbons and splendid laces, and put it on exhib­
ition with a little inkspot on its skirt, and you 
see nothing but that inkspot. Now the people of 
this country, with an exquisite fidelity to the 
best interests of the nation, saw the little bit ^ 
of a smirch on the skirt of Mr. Blaine's coat...""3̂
Frye tried, unsuccessfully to repair the damage caused by his
oratory by referring in a later speech to Blaine as the American
60
Gladstone. The Nation, America's leading liberal journal, predicted 
that Frye would find himself in trouble because of this speech. "It is 
a very remarkable statement to come from a friend of Mr. Blaine. So 
there was a smirch was there? Well, Mr. Frye tell us what it was. We 
do not agree with him about its being a 'little bit of a smirch'
The New York Times commented that Frye was a "terrible friend. Mr. 
Burchard's little alliteration must have seemed to him a mere accident 
compared to this. The terrible feature of Mr. Frye's remark is its
59. Nevins, 0£ . c i t . ,  p . 291.
60. K.J., Sept. 6, 1886, p. it.
61. Nation, Aug. 26, 1886, p. 168.
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truth."62
Frye denied ever making the statements^ and Blaine insisted that 
Frye was misquoted. Nevertheless, the damage had been done and the 
impression remained indelible on the minds of the -democratic opponents.
In late September, Frye, fresh from a smashing Republican victory 
at home, returned to Washington to assume his position on the sub-com­
mittee appointed to investigate the fisheries question.
Between September 30, and October 6, Senators Frye, Edmunds, and 
Saulsbury interrogated fishermen in Boston, Portland, Gloucester, and 
other ports along the coast. The committee members were more con­
vinced, if convincing they needed^ that American fishermen had been
6*5grossly maltreated. However, for the sake of truth, it should be 
noted that the members of the committee received an unilateral ed­
ucation because all of the interviewees were Americans.
The fishing season was over for 1886 and Congress did not convene 
until December. During this interval, Secretary Bayard attempted to 
effect a solution by the use of the commission. However, Frye and 
others kept the atmosphere of animosity alive by publicly pronouncing 
that Canada needed American markets and the United States could dictate 
its own terms to her.^ Therefore, a commission was not needed.
62. N.Y.T., Aug. 2k, 1886, p. 2.
63. Denials can be found in the Nation, Sept. 2, 1886; K.J., Sept. 6, 
1886; and the Bangor Whig and Courier, Sept. 6, 1886.
61;. Tansill suggests that Frye was looking for political ammunition, 
0£. cit., p. U;,
65. Senate Documents, Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
1789-1901, 56 Cong., 2 Sess., 1900-1901, V01 . 23, p. 5, No. 231, P.
66. N.Y.T.. Oct. 11, 1886, p. 1;.
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On January 19, 1887, Senator Edmunds introduced a resolution 
based on the committee's findings. Frye concurred in this report and 
actively supported its recommendation that the President be authorized 
to protect the rights of American fishing vessels by denying the ports 
of the United States to other countries, meaning of course, Canada.^ 
This resolution contained Frye's basic assumption; Canada would be 
forced to grant the United States concessions because she needed the 
American market. However, if Canada did not submit, the New ihgland 
fishermen would be freed from Canadian competition in United States' 
markets. The New England fishing econoiry would be stimulated by either 
proposal.
In support of this resolution Frye, on January 2k, 1887, reiter­
ated that Canadian seizure of United States' vessels was unwarranted 
because none of the provisions of the Convention of 1818 had been 
violated by Americans. He asked that the measure pass and then "you 
will never hear of another outrage by the colonies of Great Britain 
while the world lasts.
This resolution appears to be the catalytic agent needed by the 
State Department to open negotiations. Frye and his colleagues had 
forced Canada toward negotiations, while their intentions were probably, 
to bully her into acceptance of their position without negotiations.
New England Senators may have sensed the conciliatory attitude of 
Canada and wished to avoid any negotiations which, they feared, would 
reach agreements disadvantageous to their interests. This apprehen-
67. Senate Documents, op. cit.. p. 631.
68. Cong. Record. Ii9 Cong., 2 Sess., P. 933.
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siveness caused Senator Hoar of Massachusetts to introduce a measure 
on February 2k, 1887, prohibiting negotiations with Canada concerning 
"the reduction, change, or abolition of any of our existing duties or 
imports."^ This proposal apparently portended the impossibility of 
any form of settlement; it also confirmed Secretary Bayard’s belief 
that the Republican leaders were "reckless, selfish, and mercenary."^0 
On February 2k, Frye, Morgan, and Hoar were appointed Senate con­
ferees to determine the wording of the bill introduced by Senator
Edmunds. The bill passed the Senate and the House and President
71Cleveland signed it on March 3, 1887.
Presidential reasons for signing the bill were understandable. 
Concurrence offered a way to remove the pro-British label from the ad­
ministration while simultaneously forcing Canada to accept an arrange­
ment on the fisheries question even if hopes for tariff reductions were 
dead. Both were diametrically opposed to Republican intentions.
Though Cleveland signed the Edmunds bill, he was opposed to the 
Hoar resolution. Bayard and Cleveland both considered it to be an un­
precedented attempt to limit the President’s treaty making powers.^ 
Indeed, Senator Morgan stated that consultation with the Senate on 
appointments for commissions was unnecessary; he argued that such 
executive authority was implicit in the presidential treaty-making 
powers. Cleveland apparently subscribed to Morgan's interpretation
69. Ibid., p. 219.
70. Tansill, 0£. cit., p. 32.
71. Ibid.
72. Nevins, o£. cit., p. 35
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since he authorized Secretary Bayard to appoint a commission anyway.
In October, Bayard named as commissioners, James B. Angell of the 
University of Michigan, William Putnam who had served as counsel in
the David Adams case, and known as one of the foremost experts on
73international law, and himself, British representatives were Joseph 
Chamberlain, Sir Charles Tupper and Sir Lionel Sackville-West, the 
British Minister to the United States. With the exception of West, 
the delegation proved to be inexorably determined to give Canada a 
"fair" treaty.^ 1
Nelson Dingley, the champion of the fisheries in the House, wrote 
that the fishermen would be content with the commission. They had 
feared the possibility that the commission would consider more than 
the issues of the line of the three mile limit and the rights of .Amer­
ican fishermen in Canadian ports. Dingley had feared that they would 
negotiate the free admission of Canadian fish into the United States. 
However, he admitted finally, that he was confident that Messrs.
Putnam and Angell (not Bayard) would not undertake more than the dis- 
7 £
puted question, Dingley expressed the feeling s of his Maine con­
stituents and preferred to wait for the treaty to reach the Senate be­
fore opposing any of its provisions. He was, in short, willing to 
give the commission a chance.
Dingley's attitude coincided with that of the New Xork Chamber of
73. Tansill, 0£. cit., p. 55.
7k. Nevins, 0£. cit., p. 1*08.
75. Dingley, 0£. cit., p. 28it-85.
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Commerce and Jay Gould.76 Apparently some big-business interests 
favored a peaceful solution to the problem. Secretary Bayard became 
quite optomistic about a treaty's chance in the Republican controlled 
Senate.7? However, this optimism proved to be premature.
On November 7, an unidentified New England Senator released a 
statement to the Boston Post noting that President Cleveland had to 
obtain Senate confirmation of the American commissioners. The state­
ment predicted that the Senate would reject them. Even if the com­
mission met and produced a treaty, the Senator declared that the Senate 
would reject it.
On November 22, 1887, Frye was interviewed by a reporter of the 
Boston Journal, a Blaine organ. In answer to questions relating to the 
commission appointments Frye replied, "there is either hopeless igno­
rance or a desire to completely surrender to Sir Lionel West^®..,
Bayard has a soft side for E n g l a n d . . , A s k e d  to explain Cleveland's 
attitude Frye said, "he simply doesn't know... Blaine would have at 
once availed himself of the power granted by Congress and the outrages 
would have ceased." Frye insisted, still, that America should close 
her ports to Canadian ships, rather than attempt a peaceful solutionB
Throughout the treaty negotiations, the British delegation pressed 
for tariff reductions. Secretary Bayard knew that such concessions
76. Tansill, ojo. cit.. p. 60-61.
77. Ibid., p. 61.
78. West actually remained quiet except to adjourn. See Nevins, 
0£. cit., p. U09.
79. Bangor Whig and Courier, Nov. 22, 1887, p. 2.
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would jeopardize any treaty which might reach the Senate and refused 
to consider them.®0 -Actually, Bayard favored a reciprocity agreement 
but the partisan attacks by Frye and his colleagues had destroyed any 
hopes of success along that line. -Also, bitterness engendered by the 
Halifax Award had not yet subsided.
The Bayard-Chamberlain agreement, representing two months' work
by the commission was presented to the Senate on February 20, 1888.
It was accompanied by a message from President Cleveland urging its
approval. Cleveland, Bayard, and the Canadian representatives con-
Atsidered the settlement to be just and equitable. x Essentially the 
terms of the treaty were as follows: (1) A mixed commission would be 
appointed to delimit the territory named in Article I of the Convention 
of 1818. (2) Free navigation for American fishing vessels in the 
Straits of Caseo were assured. (3) Free access to the ports and harbors 
of Canada to purchase wood and obtain water, with a few minor restric­
tions was guaranteed. (Lt) The three mile limit should be measured not 
from headland to headland but from the low water mark, again with 
minor exceptions. (5) Although no provisions for reciprocity were in­
cluded in the treaty, Article XV said, "Whenever the United States 
shall remove the duty from fish-oil, whale oil, seal oil, and fish of 
all kinds (except fish preserved in oil)" then the United States 
(fishermen) could purchase, without license, bait, ice seines, lines, 
and all other supplies besides the privileges of transshipment of
80. Ibid., p. 2.
81. Ibid., p. 7?
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catch, and shipping of crews,0<:
Immediately the Republican press attacked the treaty as a "sell­
out" and American diplomacy was depicted as being at its "low water
Q O
mark," J Nelson Dingley described the agreement an "abject surrender" 
and said, "it certainly can not get the necessary two-thirds vote 
One Bangor, Maine, paper reported confidently "that this one-sided 
agreement would be promptly rejected by the Senate. The Eastern 
Daily Argus, the most powerful Maine Democratic newspaper, considered 
the treaty a "practical solution of the great q u e s t i o n , a n d  roundly 
condemned Frye for attacking the treaty before the Congress had a
On
chance to consider it. The Maine newspapers, predominately Repub­
lican, opposed the treaty because it would have enhanced Cleveland's 
prospects for re-election in the fall. Maine's Blaine was a likely 
Republican presidential aspirant. As one Republican Senator was 
quoted, "The fact is that just now we cannot afford to let this ad­
ministration do anything."^®
The first official onslaught of the treaty was initiated by Frye 
on March 1$, 1888. He requested that the President send to the Senate
82. The Treaty is recorded in Senate Executive Documents, 50 Cong., 
1 Sess., 1887-88, Vol. 10, No. 1 7 ^
83. Tansill, o£. cit., p. 77.
8U. Dingley, og. cit., p. 292.
85. Bangor Whig and Courier, Feb. 23, 1888.
86. Portland Eastern Argus, Feb. 22, 1888.
87. Ibid., Feb. 22, 1888.
88. Quoted in Tansill, op. cit., p. 78. (Memorandum to Bayard).
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the minutes and protocols of the commission's meetings.89 The resol­
ution did not include the usual addition to such requests, namely, that
transmission of said documents be contingent upon whether the request
90would be detrimental to the public service.'
Bayard thought this resolution was "without precedent in form and 
substance. He had practically given up the treaty anyway. When 
the Chamber of Commerce of New York City and other big business organ­
izations had voted against it, he prepared for the worst.
On May 7, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made its report. 
The majority report, signed by Frye, attacked the treaty viciously.
But President Cleveland was their main target because he had defied 
the Senate's wish that no commission be formed. It recommended that
the "ill advised negotiations" should not receive the support of the 
92Senate.
The minority report, in contrast, was an extended investigation of 
the fisheries question since 1818. It was well prepared and consti­
tuted a cogent defense of the treaty. Senator Morgan, who also de­
fended the treaty in the Senate, and Secretary Bayard were its chief 
authors.^ The report argued that Cleveland's refusal to obtain 
Senate approval of his three commissioners was consistent with a long 
list of precedents. The report urged that the treaty be supported un-
89. Cong. Record, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 2093.
90. Tansill, 0£. £it., p. 79.
91. Ibid., p. 79. Letter from Bayard to Senator Gray.
92. Senate Documents, No, 231, Ft,8, 56 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 286-333.
93. Tansill, o£. cit.. p. 80.
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animously by the Senate while charging that the critics of the treaty
9h
were simply over-zealous partisans searching for political ammunition.
In an open session, rather than executive session, the treaty was 
brought to the floor of the Senate on May 29, 1888. Frye hoped to 
gain the most by letting the public hear his partisan views and assail­
ed the treaty vehemently.
His attack was composed of generalizations. At one point, he 
intimated that Senator Payne of Ohio was "unpatriotic" because he de­
fended the treaty. This slur was applauded by the gallery and spurred 
on by this support of his chauvinistic oratory, he continued to ex­
coriate the treaty.^ Some Senators, Frye argued, were threatening to 
place fish on the free list if the Senate failed to accept the treaty. 
This action he would "deplore" and pleaded with the Senate not to be 
duped by British diplomacy as it had been so many times previously
The intensity of Frye's vehemence was partially caused by Senator 
Payne's insinuation that Frye might be playing politics with his 
opposition to commissioner Putnam. Frye, apparently, hurt by this 
accusation answered Payne by explaining his relationship with Putnam.
"I have only to say further about % .  Putnam that 
he is an honest man, a good lawyer, and the bemocratic 
candidate for governor of Maine. I am sorry for him 
that he is going to be beaten, and that this issue 
will do as much to that end as anything else."97
Frye's opposition to Putnam undoubtedly influenced his position in
9l*. Senate Documents, No. 231, Pt,8, 56 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 286.
95. Cong. Record, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1*698-99.
96. Ibid., p. 1*697.
97. Ibid., p. 1*700,
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regard to the treaty. One can be sure that the Republican Party could 
ill afford a Democratic victory in the "portentous” September election 
in Maine.^
Frye continued his diatribe by laboriously attacking the treaty's 
provisions one by one. In each case he decided that the United States 
had gained nothing that she did not have before and that the British 
had conceded what "no civilized nation on the face of the earth would 
deny to the vessels of ary nation in d i s t r e s s . T h e  climax of the
Maine Senator's remarks rested on emphasizing that Canadian newspapers
100
favored the treaty. The implication was that if the journals support­
ed the treaty it meant that the United States must have received "the 
short end of the deal." Later research has proved that the Canadian 
press was equally divided, the conservative newspapers supported the 
treaty while the liberal press opposed it.'*'0'1' Frye, obviously, was 
citing the conservative newspapers rather than the liberal, thus dis­
torting the truth in order to re-inforce his own position. Frye con­
cluded that the treaty was "a dishonorable, humiliating, and cowardly 
102surrender."
The Senate debate was intermittent during the ensuing weeks. Re-
;93. The Maine press seemed to favor Frye's position in regards 
Putnam. The Bangor Whig and Courier attacked Putnam as "Cleveland1s 
negotiator." See, August 11, l898.~ Also, "we know what we want and 
if he /Putnam/ thinks he can fool us he is mistaken." Ibid., Aug. 22, 
1888.
99. Cong. Rec., 50 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1+701+-1+705.
100. Ibid., pp. 1+707-1+708.
101. Tansill, o£. cit,. p. 78 ff.
102. Cong, Rq c ., 50 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1+708.
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marks by Frye and his colleagues were accepted by New Englanders as 
true, although comments from other sections were not complimentary.
E.L. Godkin in the Nation criticized Frye for his recklessness and 
generalizations and depicted Frye's speech as being a "boisterous 
arraignment" of this treaty and all previous fisheries treaties.
On August 9, 1888, Senator Morgan took the floor in an effort to 
save the treaty for the administration. During his remarks, he accused 
Frye of perpetuating "a mess" for a paltry sum of money as would be 
derived from an increase in the t a r i f f . H e  charged that Frye wished 
for political union with Canada and that the only difficulty standing 
in the way of this desire was the fact that Canada would have the same 
tariff as would the United States. This would hurt the Maine fishing 
industry. The frustrated Morgan then assailed Frye and the fishing 
interests of New England. He saids
"Whose market is it? The market of the halibut 
ring, the fisherman's association, the combine who 
use it for their own purposes, not the market of 
the American fishermen.... All of these complaints, 
now for seventy years, have come from one fishing 
interest in this country...that of New England."105
Morgan reminded Frye that there were many more fishermen in the 
South and in the interior who were not complaining and that the New 
England fishing industry had received bounties and subsidies and still 
it diminished in size. Such reasoning was to no avail; on August 21,
103. Nation, June lit, 1888, p. U83-3h.
10l*. Cong. Rec., 50 Cong. 1 Sess., p. 7389
105. Ibid., p. 7391.
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1888, the Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty was defeated by a -vote of yeas -
■1 r\ /L
twenty-seven, nays - thirty, absent - nineteen.
Historians have charged that the treaty opponents acted with 
partisan intent. Frye, with the possibility of Blaine's election in 
1888, the Putnam candidacy for governor of the State of Maine, and his 
natural anti-Democratic philosophy was incapable of acting differently 
than he did. As an Anglophobe because of British attitudes during the 
Civil War, he could not consider Great Britain in any other light than 
an opportunistic, greedy, and selfish country.
With the treaty's defeat the nodus vivendi agreed upon earlier be­
came e ffective.Negotiations continued between 1888 and 1911 when 
a general reciprocity settlement was finally concluded only to be re­
jected by the Canadian parliament. Finally, in 1912, by the virtue of 
a Hague award, the question was solved to the satisfaction of both 
parties.
Actually, Secretary of State John Hay in 1900, attempted to 
settle the question and received the approval of Senator Lodge and 
Frye. ° This would seem to indicate that either Frye had acted 
partisanly in 1888 or he had reversed his position regards to Great 
Britain. Both were true. Frye admitted his pleasure at Great Brit­
ain's support of United States' foreign policy during the Spanish-Amer­
ican War and after. Even as early as Cleveland's second administration, 
(1392-1396), Frye cooperated with the State Department and Richard
106. Ibid., p. 7768.
107. Tansill, o£. cit., p. 86.
108. Ibid., p. 92.
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Olnoy the Secretary of State when the latter was in need of help to
109settle the Pribilof Islands seal controversy.
In summation, it should not be forgotten that Frye's opposition 
to the Mills bill (a democratic low tariff measure which passed the 
House in the summer of 1888) was inextricably involved with the fish­
eries question. Frye was unable to oppose one and support the other 
and remain consistent in his beliefs.
109. Ibid., p. 352
THE TARIFF AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
Senator Frye's position on tho tariff question is discerned from 
the discussion of the Bayard-Chamberlain negotiations. Frye was a 
high protectionist and consistently followed this position until his 
death.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century Republicans and 
some Democrats believed in tho necessity of maintaining a high tariff 
to protect the industrial interests. A  tariff for revenue only was 
considered inadequate. It was their belief that prosperity for all 
economic interests depended on protection for a few; any other policy 
would place the -American nation in a precarious industrial position in 
relation to Great Britain and the continent. They reasoned that money 
should not leave the country. A  country should have more exports than 
imports and the revival of a strong merchant marine was essential for 
the growth of foreign commerce.
Frye was a zealous advocate of these policies. Shortly after he 
had replaced Blaine as Senator, Congress was seriously considering the 
question of a tariff revision downward. Majority opinion held that a 
commission should be appointed to study the question and to recommend 
changes to Congress. This was done. But because the commission was 
composed of protectionists, the final result was only a reduction of 
about five per cent.
In the discussion prior to the appointment of the commission,
Chapter III
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Frye was at his protectionist best. Although in favor of a commission
because, "he recognized that our tariff laws must be just and equitable,
2
and the existing law does not in all respects answer this demand;"
h® made his position on the tariff clear.
"I am a protectionist from principle. If there 
was no public debt, no interest to pay, no pension 
list, no arny and no navy to support, I still should 
oppose free trade ... and tariff for revenue only....
What are free trade and a tariff for revenue only?
They are one and the same, now and forever as in­
separable as Siamese twins."3
Following this declaration of principle, Frye denounced the per­
petrators of what he thought was an unsound tariff policy: "The only 
prominent champions of free trade to-day in the world are England and 
the Democratic Party of the United States.
Frye was not being facetious or "politiking" when he made these 
statements. He maintained persistently until his death that Great 
Britain was America's most dangerous competitor, economically and mil­
itarily. Dike many of his colleagues, he twisted the lion's tail when­
ever the opportunity offered, as in the Bayard-Chamberlain negotiations.
Probably no man in the United States believed in the tariff as a 
panacea for the economic ills more than did Frye. Continuously, 
throughout his career, he gave speech upon speech exalting the tariff 
and each followed essentially the reasoning contained in his Senate 
speech supporting the commission:
2. Cong. .Rec., it7 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1055.
3. Ibid., p. 1050.
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"...we grow rich and powerful under protection, 
and yet we have free trade more absolute and 
abundant than all the rest of the world, between 
the thirty-eight states and nine territories.,, 
protection has invariably brought us prosperity, 
increased wages, decreased cost of manufacturers, 
and furnished a ready market for our farmers.
As has already been seen, Frye's desire for a high tariff on fish 
from Canada helped to secure the defeat of the fisheries treaty. Pres­
ident Cleveland had wanted a lower tariff to encourage freer trade and 
to remove indirect government support of manufacturing which, he felt, 
had been a detriment to other elements of the cconony. In his annual 
message to Congress in December 1887, he recommended wholesale tariff
reductions. Frye vehemently opposed this message because of its
6"suicidal" possibilities to American prosperity. However, the fact 
that this proposal by Cleveland was contemporary to the heated Bayard- 
Chamberlain negotiations should not be overlooked.
For a number of years a treasury surplus had been accumulating. 
Cleveland felt that this surplus could most easily be reduced by a 
tariff reduction, particularly, since, according to the President, the 
tariff was "strangling" competition and increasing the wealth of only a 
protected few, namely, the Captains of Industry.
Cleveland had defined the issue and the presidential election of 
1888 was fought over it. Republicans interpreted the measure, for 
political reasons, as a free trade document and Frye was no exception. 
On January 23, 1888, at the height of the fisheries controversy, Frye
5. Ibid.
6. Lewiston Journal. December 26, 1887, p. 2.
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assailed the message as "a free trade document pure and simple."7 
Reading from English newspapers that were in favor of the message, he 
declared that the English were trying to invade the home market of the 
United States. .After giving a list of often cited statistics showing 
how prosperous America had becomo under a protective tariff, he pro­
ceeded to offer his remedy for the surplus. "He would repeal all in­
ternal revenue taxes. If that proved to be too much then taxes on 
liquors and tobacco could be repealed along with the duty on sugar."® 
This last proposal would appear rather conspicuous if it had been in­
cluded in one of Frye's many temperance speeches; however, all crusades 
are easily forgotten when danger strikes at the roots of one's secu­
rity, in this case, the tariff. A reduction of the tax on liquors would 
certainly not make the price of that commodity ary higher for those who 
bought it and would, no doubt,enable those who found liquor too ex­
pensive with a tax on it to buy it when the tax was removed. This 
formula for reducing the surplus was inconsistent, also, with a speech 
delivered October 19, 1887, at the Boston Home Market Club. Frye had 
just returned from Europe and his speech was based on observations 
made while there. Warning the group of the evils of free trade he 
said:
"Are you going to allow men who call themselves 
reformers, men who pretend to believe in free trade - 
an utter absurdity, no nation believes in it - are you 
going to allow them to strike at your home market? — - 
Within the last 20 years, we have progressed marvelously 
under our tariff. It was forced upon us by the war. It 
was one of the most beneficient things that the war achieved
7. Cong. Rec., $0 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 618.
8. Ibid.. p. 618-621;.
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for us. Why should we give up this vantage 
ground? Why should we trifle with it?"9
In this same speech, instead of mentioning tobacco and liquor 
taxes, he advocated a different method for dispersing the surplus. 
Essentially he proposed that ten million dollars a year be granted in 
subsidies to American shipbuilders and owners, ten million to educate 
people, and he advocated putting 500,000 men to work digging the 
Nicaraguan Canal.'*'0 This change of position indicated that Frye was 
not favorable to a reduction of the surplus by reducing revenues, but 
rather by expending revenues on public and private projects. It would 
seem logical that Frye should recommend, as in January, a reduction of 
the tax on liquor and tobacco or he should not have mentioned liquor 
or tobacco since this position was not shared by the Republican Party. 
The speech caused E.L. Godkin of the Nation to pounce on Frye with his 
usual pungency by declaring that Frye "did not care where the surplus 
was expended as long as a tariff was maintained."^
Aided by Cleveland's message, the Democrats in the House managed 
to pass the Mill's Bill which contained the substance of Cleveland's 
proposals. Not to be out done, the Republican Senate, in the heat of 
the Presidential campaign, proposed a substitute bill which was highly 
protectionist. Simultaneously, the heated controversy over the fisher­
ies question confused issues so that the conferees from the House and 
Senate could not agree on a compromise tariff. As a result, the tariff
9. Albert Clark, The Tariff Made Plain, "What Senator Frye Saw in 
Europe," (Boston: 1906), p. 30-36.
10. Nation, Oct. 27, 1887, p. 189.
11. Ibid,
proposals of both parties were thrown to the electorate for a decision
12in the presidential election of 1888.
Benjamin Harrison emerged the winner in the election. The Re­
publican Party quickly interpreted the results as a mandate for their 
policies including a high protective tariff. Actually Cleveland had 
received a plurality of the popular vote. Any mandate based on such 
an incongruity, therefore, was bound to spell trouble for those who 
blindly and hopefully read in the results of the election that the 
people were in agreement with their policies.
Meanwhile, James G. Blaine had become Secretary of State for 
President Harrison. Blaine had been a protectionist whenever such a 
policy served his best interests as a politician. Frye sponsored
13
Blaine's bill which proposed a meeting of a Pan-American Congress.
The bill passed and Blaine duly invited the South American republics 
to a meeting to be held in Washington. Paradoxically, Blaine's pur­
pose in calling such a conference was to arrange favorable trade re­
lations among Pan-American countries through tariff revisions.
The delegates to the Congress representing eighteen nations con­
vened in Washington in October of 1889, and were immediately taken on a 
6,000 mile junket throughout the East and Middle West. Finally they 
again assembled in Washington to resume deliberations. Unfortunately, 
Frye publicized his views on the purpose of the conference. The Hew 
York Times reported Frye's comments and sardonically editorialized:
"Mr. Frye avows that the main object was to get
h5
12. Oberholtzer, 0£. cit., Vol. U, p. i|87-il90.
13. Ibid., p. 99.
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them /the delegates/here and to take them about 
the country with a view to impressing them with 
the greatness of its resources and its power as a 
nation, as a means of commanding respect. 'This,' 
he thinks, 'might have a practical result in teach­
ing them to look to this country as an arbitrator 
in their national disputes.' He thinks, also, that 
the congress may lead to the adoption of a common 
silver coin to the profit of our Western silver 
mines. Beyond that he does not expect much...
If there was an /sic7 sincerity in Secretary 
Blaine's address of welcome to the delegates..„ 
he could not have been privy to Senator Frye's 
little game."Id
The editorial made additional comments on Frye's inconsistencies 
in advocating trade with South American countries and also, demanding 
the high protective tariff. It suggested, sarcastically, that Frye 
might ask Congress to subsidize steamships to carry American manufac­
tured goods to Latin American countries and thus solve the problem of 
an adequate merchant marine by "robbing Peter to pay Paul." The 
editorial summarized its feelings toward Frye by ridiculing his 
position:
"The whole thing is a tough of inconsistencies 
and absurdities, and we may as well make up our 
minds either to remove the barriers to foreign 
trade or go without it. Putting up barriers and 
trying to force trade over them is about as sensible 
as building a fence for the mere purpose of climbing 
over it."1-*
Even, if as '■'rye suggested, the conference had been motivated by 
economic greed, it apparently was not successful. Besides a provision 
for settling disputes by arbitration, proposals for an intercontinental 
railroad, customs unions, and an international American bank were
1)4. N.Y.T.. Nov. 16, 1889, p. It.
15. Ibid
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offered. However, Canada was not invited and her absence made it im­
possible to conduct discussions relating to trade arrangements, osten­
sibly the main reason for calling the Congress to Washington. There­
fore, the Congress adjourned with little likelihood that any of its
16
provisions would be implemented.
Secretary Blaine tried desperately in the ensuing months to obtain 
favorable support for his reciprocity ideas. He was unable to under­
stand why Congress allowed only $68,000,000 or eight per cent of United
States' exports to go to Latin American countries while importing
17$170,000,000 worth of goods from those same nations. The chief in­
strument for securing a more favorable balance of trade with these 
countries was the duty on sugar. Republican Senators wanted to abolish 
this duty and thereby lower the treasury surplus. Such a measure would
aid the consumer because nine-tenths of the sugar used in this country
18was imported from Cuba, Hawaii, and the Latin American countries. 
Blaine, however, saw a splendid opportunity for exacting trade con­
cessions on a reciprocal basis using sugar as a lure. Accordingly, he
got Eugene Hale, Frye's colleague from Maine, to offer an amendment to
19the pending McKinley tariff bill which would effectuate his plan.
On July 11, 1890, he expressed his opinions in an open letter to Frye, 
who was a member of the Senate Finance Committee.
16. Bailey, 0£. cit., p. 1(1*5.
11. Muzzey, 0£. cit., p. 14*3.
18. Ibid.. p. 1(1*2.
19. Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies of the 19th Century, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1903), Vol. II, p. 277.
"Here is an opportunity where the farmer may 
be benefited.... Here is an opportunity for a 
Republican Congress to open the markets of forty 
millions of people to the products of American 
farms. Shall we seize the opportunity or shall
we throw it away? --  there_is not a section or
a line in the entire bill /McKinley Tariff Bill/ 
that will open the market for another bushel of 
wheat or another barrel of pork."20
Blaine wrote a similar letter to the major of Augusta, Maine, and 
July 26, 1890, he wrote again to Frye expressing the same sentiments. 
These letters received nation-wide publicity. Unfortunately, Blaine's 
proposal was defeated largely because the protectionist Congress feared 
that any such arrangement would have to include Canada. Canada was 
feared as an economic competitor which might ruin the American econony 
if her goods were allowed to compete with American goods. Thus ended 
an intelligent, equitable, and sound proposal buried by the McKinley 
Tariff of 1390, a tariff for which Frye voted.^
Frye's tariff ideas were well known by 1890. He always supported 
a high tariff, but was never,personally, a potent force for enacting 
the tariffs. In I89U, he voted against the Democratic Milson-Oorman 
Tariff. In 1897, he voted for the Republican Dingley Tariff. He fail­
ed to see that the home market was diminishing as the industrial output 
increased. He always advocated a tariff higher than the prevailing one 
hoping to capture the remaining few areas of the home market. He did 
not understand that unless the United States imported, she could not 
export.
After the passage of the Democratic, but still protectionist
20. Ibid.. p. 278.
21. Cong. Rec., 5l Cong., 1 Sess., p„ 99^2
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due to crippling amendments, Wilson-Gorman Tariff of I89U, Frye gave a 
speech at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in which he analyzed the depressed 
economic conditions of the country and offered his remedies.
"Just as soon as we get the chance we /^Republican 
Party/7, will revise the tariff, and on old lines too.
We shall admit free of duty all we need and can't 
produce here, other than luxuries. On everything 
made in Europe that competes with American labor a 
duly will be placed equal to the difference between 
wages here and there. It will be framed on the 
lines of the McKinley Bill, the best tariff measure
ever enacted."22
Frye also claimed that Thomas B. Reed had more to do with the 
bill's passage than McKinley. This caused one paper to note the basic 
economic fallacies contained in Frye's address and that he was hurting 
Reed's chances for the Presidency in 1896 by attaching his name to the
abominable tariff of 1890.
"We have too much respect for Mr. Reed to suppose 
that he is not thoroughly nauseated by it. If Frye 
continues this kind of oratory, Mr. Reed's chances,
for a Republican nomination will promptly vanish. t»23
In November of 1895, Frye delivered a similar tariff speech at
Biddleford, Maine.
"We propose to run this government on the receipts 
of a protective tariff. Congress may be obliged to 
touch the tariff but it will do so as lightly as 
possible for when tariff revision takes place it must 
be done under the Administration of a party in full . 
sympathy with the protection of American industries."2^
To the writer it appears that the tariff had made Frye a
monomaniac. Every action, every move depended first on how it would
22. N.Y.T., Mar. 29, 1895, p. 1.
23. Ibid.. Mar. 30, 1895, p. 2. 
2k. Ibid., Nov. 22, 1895, p. 2.
5 o
affect the tariff. The Democrats had control of all branches of the 
government in l894 . However, there were enough protectionist Democrats, 
if they voted an bloc with the Republicans, to stop any appreciable 
reduction in the tariff. The R epublicans gained control again in 1896 
and in the following year passed the Dingley Tariff which imposed the 
highest duties of any tariff to that date. Frye backed this revision 
and since Dingley was also from Frye's home city of Lewiston, he 
probably did considerable coaching of Mr. Dingley.
It is difficult, if not futile, to understand the logic of Frye's 
position on the tariff. He would faithfully vote for a high tariff 
and simultaneously lament the decline of the merchant marine. One 
source commented on this paradox by calling attention to the fact that 
"Senator Frye's party has for years devoted two-thirds of its dynamic 
energy and substantially all of its campaign money to the attempt to
prohibit and destroy commerce. Dingleyism and extension are incom-
25patible..." -Apparently Messers. Dingley and Frye did not share that 
opinion.
25. Ibid., June 22, 1998
Chapter IV 
THE MERCHANT MARINE
The growth of the United States' merchant marine had been continu­
ous until the Civil War. The era of the forties and fifties had seen 
clipper ships and packets in almost every part of the world. However, 
circumstances during and after the war caused the merchant marine fleet 
to disintegrate until in 1900 the American merchant marine carried only 
8.7 per cent of United States' foreign commerce.
There are numerous reasons for this collapse. Great Britain had 
greatly exceeded American progress in the development of her steel and 
iron industry. When tho revolution from wooden to iron ships was tak­
ing place in the 1850's and 1860's, she produced steel ships more 
cheaply than did American shipbuilders. Therefore, she carried the 
world's commerce with a distinct advantage over American wooden vessels. 
Another serious blow to the merchant marine was a law enacted by 
Congress in 1866, which stated that "no American vessel that had been 
transferred to foreign registry during the Civil War should be re­
admitted to American registry."^ Since American shipowners, wishing to 
save their vessels from Southern raiders, had sold one-third of the 
American merchant fleet during the war to foreign countries, one-third 
of the carrying fleet was eliminated.
Professor Zeis, who has written a definitive account of American 
shipping policy, feels that the most important single cause for the de­
cline was the maintenance of navigation laws which restricted American
1. Paul Zeis, American Shipping Policy, (Princeton: Princeton Univ­
ersity Press, 193*U, p. 15.
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registry to ships built in the United States and owned by American
2
citizens living in the United States. These laws prohibited the pur­
chasing of foreign ships for use in the carrying trade. Since Great 
Britain was building ships at less cost than the United States and 
since American shipowners could not purchase these cheaper foreign 
built ships, the inevitable occurred. This situation seriously im­
perilled two of New England's most lucrative activities, shipbuilding 
and commerce. Therefore, it was not surprising to see as early as 
l8?0, Representative lynch of Maine trying to reverse this disastrous 
trend.
Lynch introduced a bill to provide large bounties to shipbuilders 
but only token bounties to shipowners. It did not pass the House but 
was important not only for the interest shown in the decline of the 
merchant marine, but, also, because it marked the genesis of the battle 
between those who opposed "free ships" and those who advocated generous 
government subsidies to the shipping industry. In general, the "free 
shippers" wanted the navigation laws repealed so that American ship­
owners could purchase cheaper foreign vessels. The opponents of the 
"free shippers" obviously echoed the pressures exerted by the ship­
builders whose position would be jeopardized permanently if cheaper 
foreign vessels could be bought.
For New England, the ideal program would have been one not only 
requiring American shipowners to buy their ships from native builders, 
but also, one which allowed the American fleet to compete with English
2. Ibid., p. 15.
3 . Ibid., p .  19
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ships in the foreign carrying trade. This could only be done by grant­
ing bounties or subsidies.
While James G. Blaine served as Senator from Maine, he had intro­
duced bills to aid American shipping but these failed.^* Frye assumed 
the mantle when he entered the Senate and for twenty-five years tried 
as futilely as his predecessor to solve the problems of the Maine 
shipbuilder.
Nelson Dingley was serving as a Representative from Maine's sec­
ond district much of the time while Frye was in the Senate. Since the 
second district included Bath the home of the Sewall Shipbuilding Com­
pany, Dingley allied himself with Frye to halt attempts made to allow 
"free ships" in the early 1380's,^ On January 6, 1383, in a speech on 
a "free ship" bill, Dingley declared "no policy ... that looks to mak­
ing this nation dependent upon a foreign nation, upon a nation like 
England, for the supply of vessels to carry on its merchant marine can 
be wise and safe."^ Upholding the navigation laws which prohibited 
"free ships", Dingley explained that in time of war it would be man­
datory to have a merchant fleet "of our own”. Three dqys later, 
Dingley introduced a bill to aid the merchant fleet and to encourage 
shipbuilding by the awarding of mail subsidy contracts. Frye intro­
duced the bill in the Senate where it was adopted. In the House it
7encountered violent opposition and was subsequently killed. *567
U. Cong. Bee., U5 Cong., 3 Sess., Vol. 8, p. 2132.
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In 1886, another attempt was made by Dingley during the fisheries 
controversy. It was the Dingley Shipping Bill to which Frye attached a 
rider calling for retaliatory legislation against Canadian discrimina-
Q
tion. Frye wished to build up the American fishing fleet and thus 
stimulate the faltering shipbuilding industry.
With the advent of Harrison's administration circumstances changed 
somewhat. Blaine became Secretary of State again and lost no time im­
plementing his belief that a South American trade was possible through 
the use of reciprical trade agreements and subsidies to steamship lines. 
Although his tariff ideas were repudiated, the movement for subsidiza­
tion gained momentum and in 1891, the Frye-Farguhar bill passed.
The reader will recall that Frye's solution for the treasury sur­
plus in 1887 contained an appropriation of $10,OCX),000 for ship sub­
sidies. In the 5lst Congress, he introduced several bills which would 
have relieved the burden on the merchant marine by exempting vessels 
from taxation,while paying a subsidy to shipbuilders. The most im­
portant bills, if for no other reason than that they passed, were ones
providing 30 cents a mile a ton for slow vessels built in the United
9States with American registry. To placate the owners of fast liners, 
Frye introduced another bill providing for four classes of subsidized 
steamers with payments ranging as high as six dollars a mile for first 
class liners to one dollar a mile for fourth class steamers.
Frye's purpose in these bills was simply to revive the merchant 
marine and benefit Maine shipbuilding. His position on "free ships" 89
8. Ibid., p. 269.
9. Cong. Rec., 5l Cong., 1 Sess., p. 6907.
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precluded any other solution except subsidies. Frye maintained that 
the only trouble with the merchant marine was its lack of tariff pro­
tection. "Why should we pay $15,000,000 a year to foreign built ships
for carrying our cargoes?"10 123 When he visited Europe in the spring of
„ 11 1887, he had not seen one American vessel in an' European port. Frye
was bothered by the American neglect of her merchant marine. With
Dingley, he argued that in war time it would be necessary to have a
native fleet which could be depended on. In addition, he must have
hoped that the shipbuilding industry would revive so that Maine could
be restored to her rightful place among the more prosperous states of
the Union.
Frye persistently fought for subsidies but such men as Senator
Vest of Missouri reminded the Senate periodically that Frye represented
"a shipping people". "Take away the shipbuilding from Maine and
•Othello’s occupation is gone'. A.s a matter of course, if this bill is
12passed it is better than a gold mine in Maine." Such assertions were 
difficult to deny. However, Maine was a sizeable distance from the 
supplies of steel and iron, and probably would have been at a disad­
vantage with Massachusetts, New York, or Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, 
on July 12, 1890, the Senate passed Frye's bill by a vote of 28 to 16
, 13with 4O absences.
In the House Frye's program guided by Repre sentative F arguhar was
10. Ibid., p. 69lU.
11. Ibid., p. 6913.
12. Ibid., p. 6919.
13. Ibid.
56
overwhelmingly defeated by an aroused opposition led by Joe Cannon.1**
The tonnage bill considered more iniquitous of the two was killed. The 
postal subsidy bill likewise was attacked and, although passing, was 
emasculated by cutting the payments by one-third. The Senate accepted 
the amended bill and it was enacted as the Postal Aid Law of March 3, 
1891. 15 |
The law divided mail-carrying steamships into four classes. The
fastest, at least twenty knots, would carry mails between the United
| ' | 
States and Great Britain. The second class, at least sixteen knots,
would carry mails between South America and the United States. The
third and fourth classes were granted mail delivery with the North
American continent. The first and fastest class of ships would receive
four dollars per mile for an outward voyage. The remaining three
classes would receive two dollars, one dollar, and sixty-six and two-
16
thirds cents respectively.
Originally, Frye had expected that entirely new lines would be 
formed and new ships would be built. While these vessels carried the 
mail, they could also carry other goods at rates comparable to those 
charged by competing nations, namely, Great Britain and Spain, since 
the subsidy would compensate for the difference in cost. This, pre- 
sumably, would increase the American merchant fleet so that in a few 
short years the country would be the proud possessor of a large fleet 
_____________________
i
lit. Ibid., 2 Sess., p. 3350.
15. Winthrop L. Marvin, The American Merchant Marine. (New York: 
Scribners and Sons, 1902), g. U H u  16
16. Ibid., p. 1*15.
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of first line steamships. One authority believes, as does the pr esent
writer, that this estimate would have been realized if Frye's proposal
17had been allowed to pass in its original form.
Except for two foreign built ships and two American built ships, 
the Saint Paul and the Saint L ouis, Frye's expectations failed to 
materialize. The only new line that was established was the American
Line. When the act expired in 1923, only eight lines were in opera-
18tion and without a postal subsidy they could have continued.
Frye foresaw that the bill as passed would not suffice. Both he
and Senator Hale voted against the acceptance of the House amendment
but to no avail. Frye, on the day of the vote, pleaded that a revived
merchant marine was an absolute necessity, if for no other reason
than the vessels could be used as naval auxiliaries. Actually, the
net result of the Postal Act of 1891, can be measured by the fact that
the four new ships which were engaged in carrying mails were converted
to warships during the Spanish-American War aid proved to be invaluable
20additions to the American flotilla.
Throughout the 1890's and early 1900's, the clamor for ships was 
continued by such bold advocates as Admiral Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, 
and Senator Lodge. Frye, their close friend, introduced bills and 
more bills to aid American shipping but without success. From 1892 to 
1912, every platform of the Republican party contained a plank ad- 17*920
17. Ibid., p. JrlU.
13. Zeis, 0£. cit., p. 35.
19. K.J., Mar. 3, 1891,p.l.
20. Marvin, 0£. cit., p. h2h.
vocating aid to the struggling merchant fleet. However, it was the 
methods of implementation on which proponents were attacked and de­
feated, not the principle in general.
In 1897, Frye organized a committee to promote an intense cam­
paign to expand the foreign trade fleet as an instrument of national 
defense. This group consisted of many prominent and influential 
people interested in aid to shipping and aid to themselves or their 
vested interests. Some of its leading members were: Senators Hanna, 
Perkins, Frye, and Elkins; Representative Payne of Ohio; Charles H. 
Cramp, the well known Philadelphia shipbuilder; Edwin Hyde, president 
of the Bath, Maine Shipbuilding Company; C,&. Griscom, president of 
the American Line; Theodore Search, president of the National Associ­
ation of Manufacturers; and Joseph P, Grace, of the famous Gracer-  21 L in e s .
This committee met continuously for three years in New York,
Philadelphia, and Washington. It was impossible, inspite of Frye's
contention that the only interests considered were the interests of 
22the American people, for this group not to be partial, although 
evidence of a great deal of compromise is confirmed in the report of 
the committee given by Frye to the Senate on December h, 1900. In­
stead of discriminating duties, tonnage taxes or bounties as might be 
expected from such a group, the report recommended sailing bounties 
i.e., bounties paid on tonnage of ships and miles traveled. Frye re­
ported that none of the committee was in favor of "free ships" nor 21
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21. Cong. Rec., 56 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 3h, p. 31.
22. Ibid.
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could he understand why they should b e . ^
This report of the committee was re-drafted and presented to the 
Senate, in substantially the same language, as the Hanna-Payne bill of 
1899. It was defeated and in 1900, Frye introduced it again. Frye's 
bill would have provided a general bounty of one and one-half cents a 
gross ton per hundred miles for the first 1,500 miles. Beyond 1,$00 
miles, the bounty was to be reduced to one cent for each one hundred 
miles. The total amount to be expended in one year could not exceed
$9,000,000. Frye had set this limit hoping it would facilitate the 
2llbill's passage.
Unfortunately for Frye, Senators Vest and Clay completely ana­
lyzed the bill and pointed out its defects to the Senate. They ascer­
tained that the major portions of the bounty payments would go to 
large companies such as the Standard Oil which were: already making a 
profit. Another devasting point was that no new ships could be built 
because those in the process of being built would absorb two million 
dollars beyond the nine million dollar limitation suggested by Frye. p 
If the ceiling were lifted there was no telling what the cost to the 
taxpayer would be. Th6 bill never came to a vote due to the efforts 
of Vest and Clay who convinced enough Senators that Frye was not the 
great and patriotic -American that one national magazine had described 
in a recent article. 23*5
23. Ibid., p. 32.
21*. Zeis, 0£. cit., p. 1*0.
25. Cong. Rec., 56 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 1337. Also, p. 1609-10.
26
26.. Review of Reviews, January 1901, Vol. 23, p. 15
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In his second inaugural address, President McKinley, no doubt at 
the insistence of his friend Mark Hanna, had ’urged that something be 
done for-American shipping. Complying with McKinley's sense of urgen­
cy, Frye re-introduced in December 1901, the same bill as in 1900 ex­
cluding the nine million dollar limit for bounty payments. This was a 
"last ditch" attempt to get an aid working program established. The 
culmination of eighteen years of work and thought went into the bill 
and the culmination of eighteen years of ill-will defeated the bill.
The nine million dollar limit was restored on the Senate bill which 
passed but in the House the proposal failed to survive the Committee 
on Commerce and was defeated. Apparently the American people, hav­
ing their fill of government subsidies like the railroad grants, were 
not impressed by the chauvinistic utterances of Frye and his supporters
It is not difficult to d iscern a major reason why Frye's plans 
passed the Senate but were rejected by the hostile House. Hndeniably 
the House, being popularly elected, was a more reliable reflector of 
public opinion. The Senate had become an aristocratic institution rep­
resenting the nouveau riche, as one can readily see by reading David 
Graham Phillips' exposures. The -Hewiston Senator associated with men 
of wealth and could not help but be influenced by them. Eugene Hale, 
Nelson Aldrich, and Mark Hanna, three of his closest friends were 
multimillionaires and were not noted for their records of public 
service. Quite naturally associations such as these, would bring cries 
of special privilege from many people.
Such impressions were underscored when Frye accepted an invitation 27
27. Zeis, o£. cit., p. h2
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from the commercial, steamship, and other allied groups of the City of 
New Xork to attend a huge testimonial dinner to be held in his honor 
at the Waldolf-Astoria April 26, 1899. The banquet was a "token of 
thanks from New Xork City to Frye for his indefatigable promotion of 
American commerce, particularly, for the huge appropriation Frye had 
obtained for the improvement of New York's harbor facilities. As 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, he had for years cham­
pioned "pork barrel" legislation in an attempt to improve the river 
and harbor facilities of the country, and thereby improve the status 
of the American merchant marine.
The dinner was an impressive affair. One newspaper described the 
ballroom decorations:
"The favors and designs of the evening were 
appropriate. The sherbet boxes were miniature 
channel dredges, and with the ice cream the regi­
ment of waiters carried in designs of ocean steam­
ships, steamdredges, and cornucopias. A chart of 
New Xork harbor was placed at every place.
Among the guests were Governor Theodore Roosevelt who acted as 
chairman; Senators Platt, Cutting, Depew, and many of the most prom­
inent representatives of New York's commercial interests.
Governor Roosevelt opened the banquet reading a letter from 
President McKinley commending Frye's devotion to the commercial and 
industrial interests of the country. Senator Platt seconded the 
commendation and added, "if there is a senator now in public life who
I 28
28. N.X.T., April 27, 1899, p. 1. N.Y . Tribune. April 28, p. 1.
Bangor Whig and Courier, Kennebec Journal, Lewiston Journal, and 
Bangor Commercial, all April 28, 1899, p. 1, give a similar account 
of the banquet.
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can be said to belong to us all, he is Hie Honorable William P. *rye 
of the State of Maine." Next to speak was Mr. Ambrose, state senator 
from New fork. He described Frye's cooperation when he (Ambrose) went 
to the Commerce Committee to ask for an appropriation for New York 
harbor. Frye pushed the bill through the Senate, related Ambrose, and 
when the House balked, Frye was appointed as one of the Senate con­
ferees to meet with House conferees to iron out their differences. 
Ambrose then described Frye's patience and understanding in listening 
to the "long-winded conferees" and after hearing the House proposals, 
he then replied "with a ringing declaration in favor of the New York 
measure and the House conferees were forced to yield to his logic."
After Ambrose's speech, Governor Roosevelt then introduced Frye 
who was the guest of honor and the main speaker of the evening. Frye 
began with the traditional after-dinner joke. The New York Times' 
correspondent reported this portion of his speech where Frye had an 
occassion to use the word "damn". "This sent a shiver throughout the 
galleries which were crowded with women, but the point of the story was 
caught immediately by all and was applauded by the fair hands in the 
gallery." The main portion of the speech concerned itself with the 
usual topics, the tariff, commerce, merchant marine, expansion, and 
how to promote them. He offered no new ideas but simply reiterated 
old ones and those of his party. He did point to the United States' 
unpreparedness for the Spanish-American War and blamed government 
neglect of the merchant marine for a good part of this unpreparedness. 
This probably was the only indisputable statement made that night.
Maine Republican newspapers rejoiced at seeing one of Maine's
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native sons feted by such important men.̂ 9 The Mew York Times, how­
ever, criticized Frye and "his class" with their ideas and methods and 
voiced the opinion that such ideas and methods were giving way to
others of a "broader view and a firmer grip on the facts of inter- 
30national trade."
The dinner itself was described in the New York press in column 
headlines. Some of the guests must have been uneasy,however. Senator 
Platt praised Governor Roosevelt whom, in less than a year, he was to 
"push" into the Vice-Presidency so that he would be eliminated from 
New York state politics. Platt and Frye exchanged verbal platitudes 
when memories of the bitter 1880 Republican convention, when Conkling 
and Platt humiliated Frye, must have been revived. Many who read the 
accounts of this affair must have had their beliefs confirmed, partic­
ularly, those who felt that this type of "honoring" was an example of 
what America held most sacred.
In all probability, this public association with the industrial 
magnates alienated the agrarian and reform elements of late nineteenth 
century America from supporting the merchant marine. They had had 
unpleasant experiences with railroad subsidies and found that the 
benefits of such government aid without government regulations was 
extremely limited. Such affairs as the Waldolf banquet were common­
place in that period and such names as Samuel Gompers, Robert La 
Follette, or Eugene Debs were conspicuous by their absence.
29. Bangor Daily Commercial, April 28, 1899. Contains excerps from 
other' Maine dailies.
30. N.Y.T., April 28, 1899, p. 6
Delmonico's famed New York restaurant saw many testimonial
dinners. From such celebrities as Herbert Spencer and Henry Ward
Beecher, to men like Chauncey Depew, Frye, and Charles Cramp often
attended dinners in honor of the "successful individualist" in these
years. The latter group met at Delmonico's in December 1895, to
celebrate the centennial observance of Jay's Treaty. Frye spoke in
the presence of Charles Cramp, the Philadelphia shipbuilder, pleading
for discriminatory duties and taxes to lift the merchant marine "out
31
of the depths of adversity." Perhaps a similar address at a grange 
meeting or an A.F.L. local gathering would have been more effective in 
the final realization of his plans.
From 1902 to 1910, Frye introduced more subsidy legislation but 
such proposals seldom survived the committees of the House. The
hostile, liberal press gave the public the impression that subsidies
32were raids on the treasury, and that Frye was the personal lobby for 
the shipbuilders. One of the last of Frye's efforts to revive the 
merchant marine was contained in one of the few articles Frye wrote 
for national magazines. It appeared in the June 21, 1906 issue of the 
Independent and was entitled, "The Meaning and Necessity of Ship Sub­
sidies."^
In the article, Frye expressed his disgust that American owned 
ships carried only six per cent of American foreign commerce. Having 
spent five million dollars on the harbor of Galveston, Texas, alone,
31. N.Y.T., Dec. 20, 1895, p. 6.
32. Nation, Aug. 17, 1901, p. 89.
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and having only one American ship that used its facilities seemed a
huge waste. In addition, he said that in the year 1905, the only A-
merican vessels to enter foreign ports were: one in France, two in 
Germany, and fifty-seven in England. If that was not bad enough, the 
American consul in Finland had seen only one American ship in his fif­
teen years at that post. Frye made one notable reversal of position 
in this article. The author of the Postal Subsidy  -Act of 1891, con­
fessed that a postal subsidy was an aristocracy, because it resulted 
in a monopoly. "It is to be paid to but one line. We should encourage
the building of ships by any man who has money to build them."^ He
had no idea how to do this and subsidies remained his only answer.
Frye died in 1911 and with him went his vision of a strong mer­
chant marine. Ironically, as a result of the impending World War, in 
19ll| a Democratic administration succeeded in passing legislation which 
allowed "free ships" to engage in foreign commerce, a principle that 
Frye had opposed all of his life. Subsequent legislation was passed 
embodying many of Frye's ideas, however, and by 1920, Americans could 
observe that American owned, if not built, vessels registered in the 
foreign trade were carrying forty-three per cent* of American export 
and import trade compared to the six per cent observed by Frye in 1906.
Frye was correct when he warned that the United States must not be­
come a neutral without ships in time of war. It was because of the war 
that these ideas were finally vindicated. Whatever the Senator's mo­
tives for subsidizing the merchant marine his ideas were esseiUaDy sound. *35
3b. Ibid., p. lU62.
35. Faulkner, og. cit., p. 3bl
Chapter V
FRYE AND THE RISE OF THE UNITED STATES TO A WORLD POWER 
Up to now, Senator Frye has been seen as a champion of the com­
mercial and industrial interests through his support of a high pro­
tective tariff as well as a merchant marine. The late 1880's found
1
him espousing a new idea, economic imperialism. Frye was not alone
in this crusade to find new markets for the overproduced goods of the
tariff protected industrial machine of the United States. But, only a
few men were in the position to implement this idea on the national
level, and perhaps the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered as
much of an opportunity as could be found.
Senator ^iye had been appointed to the Committee on Foreign
Relations in 1885, largely because of Senator Hoar of Massachusetts
2who was a member of that committee. Frye remained a member for 
twenty-six years terminating with his death in 1911. He was offered 
the chairmanship of the committee in 1898, but refused because he did
3
not wish to relinquish the chairmanship of the Committee on Commerce. 
From this vantage point, being associated with his friend, the power­
ful Henry Cabot Lodge, Frye could be very influential in foreign 
affairs.
The United States embarked on the expansion trail in the 1890's, 
mainly because of economic considerations. However, another important
1. Faulkner, op. cit., pp. 553-555.
2. Eleanor E. Dennison, The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(Stanfords Stanford University Press, 1942), p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. lU and p. 79.
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reason must be mentioned. In 1890, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote 
a book entitled, The Influence of Seapower Upon History. It was Mahaa's 
contention that to be an economically secure country, like Great Brit­
ain, a nation must develop a large and powerful navy. Sea power ex­
isted to protect commerce in time of peace and war. The navy would 
keep trade routes open and protect coaling and way stations along the 
trading lanes. But America had no merchant marine to protect and had 
there been any, there was only a pathetically anemic navy to protect 
i ^
Frye was greatly influenced by the Admiral's thesis as were many 
Americans. However, that the writings of Mahan were the determining 
factor behind Frye's expansionism can be easily refuted. As early as 
1888, two years before Mahan's classic, Frye showed his imperialist 
hand when he became alarmed at German overtures in the Pacific archi­
pelago of Samoa. Before the Apia incident had brought the situation 
to a head, Frye recommended that the United States display herrpower
5
as a country by sending war ships to protect its interests. Later, 
as the situation became explosive, he expressed views which portented 
the expansionist fervor ten years hence. "It (Pago Pago) is the best 
harbor in the Pacific Ocean, right in the hurricane latitude, and it 
is absolutely necessary if we have vessels in that ocean that we can 
have the right of harborage in Pago Pago - absolutely necessary 1— - 
If the Nicaraguan Canal is built --  Samoa is of infinitely greater
li. Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore! Johns-Hopkins 
Press, 1926), pp. 1-20.
5. Cong. P-ec., 50 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 108.
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importance to our interests than the Sandwich Islands... ."^
While this aggressive tone was more justified than in the fisher­
ies controversy, Frye omitted humanitarian justification for maintain­
ing American rights in Pago Pago; the economic considerations were 
paramount. Pago Pago was a coaling station and, true to Mahanism, 
coaling stations were vital possessions in order to supply American 
merchant vessels and the navy, however inadequate both were.
More significant than Samoa to the expansionist crusade was Amer­
ican interest in Hawaii. For decades a small group of Americans had 
been steadily increasing their control over the islands until in the
1880's over two-thirds of the total taxable real estate of the Hawaiian
7
Islands was in American hands. In 1875, Congress had approved a 
re cip ro city  treaty with Hawaii whereby sugar was allowed to come into  
the United States a t  an advantage over Cuban and Louisiana sugar. This 
accelerated a boom in the islan d s so th a t by 1890, three-fourths o f 
Hawaiian imports came from the United S ta te s and ninety-nine per cent 
o f her exports were absorbed by the United S ta te s . This gave Hawaii a 
very favorable balance of trade re su ltin g  in  the accumulation o f sur­
plus c a p ita l. Haw aii's phenomenal prosperity, however, depended on the
Q
United States and its favorable reciprocity arrangement.
In 1890, Frye supported the McKinley Tariff which allowed all 
sugar to enter the United States free of duty and gave Louisiana sugar 
growers a two cent per pound bounty. Hawaii was forced to compete with
6. Ibid., p. 137k.
7. Bailey, o£. cit., p. U69.
8. Pratt, 0£. cit., p. ll(.7.
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Cuban and American grown sugar causing serious economic dislocations 
in the islands as their exports nosedived. Property in Hawaii de­
preciated mare than $12,000,000. One solution to this economic dis­
aster was annexation by the United States so that Hawaii could also 
receive the sugar bounty.
The allegation that American sugar interests incited the eventual
revolution in 1893 often has been voiced. Actually opinion among the
sugar planters was sharply divided because annexation by the United
States would mean the exclusion of Oriental labor upon which the in- 
9dustry depended. The real reasons, it can be safely concluded, were
due to the material benefits expected from annexation, plus the desire
10
to oust the unstable government of Queen Liluiokalani.
On January lit, 1893, the Queen promulgated a new constitution 
highly unfavorable to American interests. Anticipating the Queen's 
move, her enemies had organized a revolutionary movement which had the 
support of the United States Minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens. On 
January 16, Stevens, at the request of the pro-annexationists, ordered 
more than 150 armed men from the U.S.S. Boston to protect American 
property in the islands, and on January 17, he recognized the revolu­
tionary government which had been so weak as to need his assistance. 
Two weeks later, Stevens proclaimed Hawaii a protectorate and advised 
the State Department to act quickly lest Great Britain annex the is­
lands. Shortly thereafter, a hastily prepared treaty for annexation
9. Ibid., pp. 156-137.
10. Ibid., p. 160.
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was submitted to the Senate.1-*- However, the Senate heeded Cleveland's 
request for delay and took no action prior to March It, 1893.
Cleveland, after becoming President for the second time, was ex­
tremely suspicious of the conduct of Minister Stevens concerning the 
revolution. Accordingly, on March 9, 1893, he withdrew the treaty 
from the Senate and promptly appointed James Blount as an official 
commissioner with "paramount authority" to visit the islands and in­
vestigate the entire situation.
When Blount arrived in Hawaii, he proceeded to lower the -American
flag over the government house and to dismiss the military who had
been ordered ashore by Stevens. His position repudiated, Stevens re-
12signed in disgust and was succeeded by Blount.
John Stevens was a Maine man. He had been co-editor of the 
Kennebec Journal with James G. Blaine and followed Blaine to Washington 
where the latter secured Stevens' appointment as Minister to Hawaii,in
131889. Being closely connected with Blaine throughout his career, 
Stevens shared Blaine's philosophy of expansion. It is little wonder 
that Cleveland's repudiation of him was taken as a repudiation of ex­
pansionism in general, and Maine's pride in her public servants in 
particular.
Blount's final report charged Stevens of improperly aiding the 
revolution and concluded that the revolution would not have material-
11. Bailey, 0£. cit., pp. Ii69-U71.
12. Ibid., p. 131.
13. Thomas Spaulding, D.A.B., Vol. 17, p. 619
71
ized without his aid.l^ As if a portent of what was to come, Frye's 
home-town newspaper viciously attacked Blount and his report as being 
in a "league with Spreckles", and earlier the Kennebec Journal, 
true to its former editor, pronounced Blount a liar and described
l£
Stevens as a great man who also was a "true, tried and tested American'.' 
It is interesting to note that while Blount's report was being dis­
cussed, the Journal carried full texts of all of Stevens' addresses, 
some delivered as far away as Chicago. Stevens had been carrying on a 
campaign of vindication and had addressed many pro-annexationists 
groups in the East.
A New fork newspaper carried a story which alleged that Senators
Hale, Aldrich, and Frye owned Hawaiian bonds and therefore had a
17monetary interest in annexation. This accusation was alarming to 
Frye and when the Blount report reached the Senate, Frye not only sup­
ported Stevens' position by describing him as a man "of the highest
-l Q
character," 1 but found it necessary to clear himself of any ulterior 
motives for his support of Stevens. At one stage of the debate, as if 
defending himself as well as his friend Stevens, Frye vehemently denied 
that Stevens would incite a revolution and protested the Democratic 
assertions to that effect. After one of Frye's remarks, Senator West
lit. Pratt, o£. cit., pp. 135-137.
15. Lewiston Journal, Nov. 21, 1893, p. 1.
16. K.J., Nov. 21, 1893.
17. Matilda Gresham, The Life and Times of Walter Q. Gresham (New 
York: Rand McNally and C0., 1919), Vol. II, p. 773. Frye was extremely 
upset by this report. The author has found no evidence either confirm­
ing or denying this allegation.
18. Cong. Rec., 53 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 72.
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from Missouri responded that he would sooner trust a hungry wolf "when 
the bleat of a farmer's lamb is heard than Senator Frye. With all his 
generous instincts it is impossible for him to be anything else but an 
intense New England Republican. Like his friend, Mr. Stevens, his 
whole political action is governed by the great truth that the earth 
belongs to the saints, and we are saints."^
Apparently such verbal attacks bothered Frye little. Shortly 
afterward he accused Blount of not writing one line of "plain, untar­
nished truth" in his report, and reiterated that Stevens was unques-20 mtionably innocent of any ulterior motives. Tempers and emotions had
become so aroused that the Kennebec Journal claimed that Frye's rather
unoriginal assessment of Blount's report would "live in history” as it
21
cut to the truth like a skilled surgeon.
On December 27, 1893, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee be­
gan an investigation to ascertain whether there were irregularities in 
Stevens' behavior or in Blount's report. A  subcommittee composed of 
Senators Frye, Morgan, Gray and Sherman worked on the project until 
late February I89i*. There was sharp disagreement on several important
points. Senator Morgan's report exonerated everyone except Queen 
22
Lili. The Republican members, including Frye, agreed with Morgan's 
assessment of Stevens but not his conclusions concerning Blount and 1920
19. Ibid., p. 19U.
20. K ,J ., December lU, 1893.
21. Ibid., December l5, 1893.
22. Senate Report, No. 227, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 173
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President Cleveland.^3 The other Democratic Senators dissented from 
Morgan's approval of Stevens' actions but approved of Blount's actions. 
Apparently the subcommittee's investigation and conclusions were 
simply perfunctory exercises confirming the members' preconceived 
notions and prejudices. Nothing new was revealed.
Frye and his Republican colleagues based their opposition on the 
technicality that Blount' s appointment without the consent of the Sen­
ate was unconstitutional.in addition, they urged that the Queen
25
not be restored as Cleveland had previously suggested. Their rec­
ommendations would preserve the integrity of the provisional govern­
ment and would (when the present furor subsided) leave the way open
26for a renewal of pressure for annexation.- This resolution never 
came to a vote.
The most important question was whether or not the United States
would adopt an expansionist program. A  resolution against annexation
was introduced by Senator Vest of Missouri and was vehemently debated.
Vest who had steadfastly opposed Frye in all of the latter's projects
27remained equally steadfast on this issue. Frye, on the other hand, 
took his usual exception to his adversary's proposal and bluntly ad­
mitted that he was, "and had been always a very emest annexationist
pQ
..." Re maintained that the best interests of Hawaii and the United 23*5678
23. Pratt, o£. cit., p. 185.
2lw Ibid., pp. 35-36.
25. Ibid.. p. 33.
26. Ibid., p. 3k
27. Cong. Rec., 52 Uong., 1 Sess., pp. 1308-1309.
28. Ibid., p. 1308.
Ik
States required annexation and advocated the immediate recognition of 
the provisional government. "Let the Senate pass the /Frye7 resolu­
tion. Let it be sent across this continent, across the ocean, down 
into the paradise of the Pacific, and let the hearts of those confid­
ing people once more be assured that they are not to be attacked by
30the troops of their own government."
As the session progressed, debate on Hawaiian annexation became 
intermittent and no general agreement seemed forthcoming. Late in 
May a breakthrough became apparent. Senator Kyle of South Dakota in­
troduced a resolution to the effect that the United States should not
use force to restore the monarchy or to maintain the provisional 
31government. To Frye and others this proposal was preferable to the 
restoration of the Queen. He expressed the sentiments of the annex­
ationists when he voted for the resolution to give the Hawaiian people
their "liberty of thought and action," but refused to vote for a reso-
32lution which proposed that the United States would not annex Hawaii. 
This concluded the first political airing of the expansionist philos­
ophy in a body not yet ready to assume the responsibilities of a colo­
nial empire.
Senator Frye was disappointed at the outcome of the treaty and 
looked forward to the day when annexation would be consummated. From 
lS9ii to 1898, Hawaii under President Dole enjoyed a great peace and 29301
29. Ibid., p. 1310.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. $192.
32. Ibid., pp. £L9U-$2li7.
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prosperity due to the abolition of the Louisiana sugar bounty and a
33reversion to the favorable position she enjoyed in 1890. If a 
stable government was all that was desired, Hawaii had one. However, 
to Frye, stability meant a relatively independent citizenry of Hawaii, 
an independence which might lead that island into the hands of Great 
Britain. It is not surprising, therefore, that Frye and others would 
be acutely aware of any change that would endanger American interests 
in Hawaii.
Early in January 1895, a small royalist group was apprehended and 
jailed by Honolulu police. The city was placed under martial law. 
However, when a sufficient amount of time had lapped, the provisional 
government saw that the severe counter measures taken by them were 
absurd. The prisoners were released and the island returned to norraal0 
Annexationists used the "revolt" as a further excuse to beat the drums 
for annexation. Quotidian speeches emphasizing the seriousness of the 
situation were made by Frye, Lodge, and others. At Bridgeport, 
Connecticut, in March, 1895, Frye delivered a bombastic speech. After 
extolling the protective tariff and the McKinley Tariff in particular, 
he added his description of the glories of late nineteenth century 
Republicanism:
"Give us Republican rule for a single decade of 
unlimited, uncrippled power, and we will show the 
people the beneficence of Republican legislation.
We will annex the Hawaiian Islands, fortify Pearl 
Harbor, build the Nicaraguan Canal and marry too 
great oceans. We will show people a foreign policy 
that is American in every fibre and hoist the American 3
33. Pratt, 0£. cit., p. 193
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flag on whatever island we think best, and no 
hand shall ever pull it down.^
American journalism would be veiy irresponsible if it allowed
such jingoism to go unchallenged. One paper, a traditional foe of
Frye and Imperialism, labeled Frye the spokesman for "a few men of
feeble nerves and narrow imagination. The Nation brought up the
embarrassing Hawaiian bond syndicate and described Frye and Senator
36Lodge as going into a "corybantic rage" to denounce the allegation.
Frye took little note of these editorial comments and extended 
his belligerency in an interview given a week later at Biddleford, 
Maine.
"I would not submit to any insult, to any 
aggressions on our rights.... I would annex the 
Hawaiian Islands at once.... I would maintain our 
coaling stations in Pago Pago against the world...
If Spain, by her actions at any time, justified us 
in so doing, I would seize and hold Cuba against 
the world.
I would accept Canada and would not offer her in­
ducements to stay away, as this last Democratic con­
gress did. It made her a present of one million 
dollars annually as a bonus to remain under the pro­
tection of Great Britain, to nag, insult, and abuse 
us. Even if ■‘hgland forced us into another declaration 
of war, I would promptly seize Canada and make her for­
ever a part of the Republic."3?
This interview caused the Nation to describe Frye as being in an 
intoxicated mental condition, while the Independent called him a *3678
3U. N.T.T.. March 29, 189$, p. 1.
3$. Ibid., March 30, 189$, p. it.
36. Nation, January 31, 189$, p. 81.
37. Lewiston Journal, April 3, 189$, P. 1.
38. Nation, April 11, 189$, p. 269.
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"buccaneer."39 The most bitter assailing came from the Times. It re­
ported that Frye had startled the public and also American friends 
abroad.
"Not that the Senator has any great reputation 
for wisdom, for he has not. But he has been con­
sidered to be rather more sensitive to ridicule 
than Boutelle (from Maine's third district) or 
Henry Cabot Lodge. This goes far beyond the con­
ventional and platitudinous Frye. It out Boutelles 
Boutelle and out Lodges Lodge.... Lodge in. his 
wildest moments never went as far as this."*10
In the same article the Times compared the growing imperialistic 
sentiment with the Salem witchcraft hysteria and concluded, facetiously, 
that Frye had lost his mind. "Such talk from a man in Senator Frye's 
position tends to make the United States odius and ridiculous before 
the world.
Much of the criticism of Frye had been accentuated by his reso­
lution introduced during the height of the "royalist threat" in Hawaii, 
Appealing to the emotions of his colleagues, he had demanded that war­
ships be sent to Hawaii to protect American life and property and to 
prevent the restoration of Queen Lili.^ This would, of course, vio­
late the Vest resolution for which he voted, the resolution saying 
that the United States would not aid either the royalists or the pro­
visional government of Hawaii with arms. Although the proposal was 
loudly denounced by the majority of the Senate, Fjye persisted, and 
finally accused President Cleveland and Secretary of State Gresham of 39
39. Independent, Quoted in the Nation, April 11, 1895, p. 269. 
bO. N.Y.T.. April 5, 1895, p. h.
IfL. Ibid., p. U.
h2. Cong. Rec., 53 Cong., 3 Sess., p. 1133.
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being friendly to the Queen and wanting to restore the monarchy.
Whether this was an attempt to arouse partisan clamor for annexation 
or a genuinely held belief is difficult to say. Whatever the reason, 
the Senate was not yet ready to commit itself to an unequivocable ex­
pansionist program.
While the debates on the Hawaiian question continued, another
equally vexatious problem was developing in Cuba. The same Wilson-
Gorman Tariff which had returned prosperity to Hawaii in l89i*-95 had
the opposite affect on the Cuban economy since it reimposed the duties
of the pre-McKinley Tariff days on Cuban sugar. This caused unstable
economic conditions in Cuba and led to a guerrilla uprising xdiich would
) ̂
not end until the Spanish-American War.
The uprising was directed against Spanish colonial rulers but 
American property was also destroyed^ with the intention of forcing 
the United States to intervene.
The Committee on Foreign Relations of which Frye was a ranking 
member recommended that the United States recognize the Cuban insur­
gents.^ During the ensuing discussion, Frye approved the proposal.
"I have but one desire, and that is to see Cuba an independent republic^ 
and whatever I can do justly and honorably to that end I am prepared to
1*3. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, (New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 
1951), p. 1*1*.
)|)|. James T. Adams, Epic of America, (Boston: Little-Brown and Co., 
1931), p. 335.
1*5. Frye had just refused the chairmanship of the committee and also 
had just been elected Pres. Pro. Tempore of the Senate. Dennison, 
o£. cit., p. 99.
1*6. Cong. Rec., f>l* Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1886.
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do."^7 A  few months previously he wanted to "seize and hold Cuba 
against the world."
In the meantime the revolutionists were taking advantage of the 
American sympathy for their cause by sending filibustering expeditions 
from American shores. Although American vigilance succeeded in stop­
ping about two-thirds of these endeavors the Spanish charged that 
United States' assistance alone was keeping the revolt a l i v e . S p a i n  
diligently checked vessels for contraband and as is inevitable in such 
cases made errors. One such error involved the American vessel Alli­
ance. The Alliance was on route from Colon, Columbia, and upon enter­
ing the Caribbean Sea was pursued by a Spanish search vessel. The
Spanish ship fired on the Alliance and though no shot reached its tar-
k9get the incident inflamed American opinion. Many newspapers imme­
diately demanded punitive measures and some called for annexation of 
Cuba. Godkin of the Nation opposed this emotional outburst and said 
of Frye, "War for war's sake has no warmer friend."'’® Frye was re­
ported to have regretted the peaceful solution of the Allianca affair 
and to have preferred war. As a matter of fact, Frye opposed American 
interception of any of the filibustering expeditions. It made him 
"weary and heartsick" to see the United States doing "police duty for
1*7. Ibid., p. 221*9.
1*8. Orestes Farrara, The Last Spanish War, (New York: Paisley Press, 
1937), p. 36.
1*9. Joseph Wisan, The Cuban Crises as Reflected in the New York Press, 
(New York: Columbia University Press., 193ii), PP. 70-71.
50. Nation, January 30, 1896, p. 28.
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the most wicked despotism ... on e a r t h . A n d  if his position re­
mained in doubt, he caused all speculation to cease by declaring, "I 
shall do or say or vote anything, consistent with honor and integrity 
--  which shall promote the success of the Cuban patriots who are -—
struggling to wrest liberty from the iron grasp of a cruel and re- 
f>2lentless despotism.”
As the election of 1896 approached, free Cuba subsided and into 
the vacuum came "free silver." Frye was being mentioned as a Vice- 
Presidential candidate and McKinley was reported as saying Frye was 
his choice, line's eyes, however, were on Tom Reed who was seeking 
the Republican nomination for President. Neither Frye nor Reed a- 
chieved success. The Vice-Presidency went to Garret Hobart of New 
Jersey. /Frye*s daughter married Hobart's sonJ
Frye gave his usual amount of speeches but did not command the 
headlines as he once had. His efforts were centered against the free
silverites, but it appears that even this issue did not inspire him
53too greatly. When Congress convened in December of 1896, Cleveland 
was a "lame duck" and Republican hopes for expansion had resumed its 
old vigor.
No sooner had William McKinley taken office than his Republican 
colleagues in the Senate began to needle him to lead the Republican 
forces in an attempt to annex Hawaii. On March 15, 1897, Frye had
51. Cong. Rec., 5U cong., 1 Sess., p. 22li9.
52. •‘■bid.
53. Frye was disgusted at the intraparty strife over the silver 
question and did not want to go to the extreme for gold. Richardson, 
op. cit., p. 519.
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seen the President and apparently received encouragement for this 
plan. Earlier in February, Frye had advocated a $100,000 ^>propria- 
tion for the improvement of Pearl Harbor with hopes of increasing 
Hawaiian dependency on the United States. Some papers assailed him 
for this proposal and one called him a "pirate and a common thief" 
claiming that Captain Kidd had used the same methods. He did not want 
to improve the harbor but rather to claim an American act of sovereign­
ty there.^ In short, Frye was using the technique of "dollar diplo­
macy" before the term originated twenty years later.
In Cuba the situation was worsening. Spanish attempts to allevi­
ate the tension had failed.^ As new outbreaks of violence occurred, 
Fitzhugh Lee, American consul-general in Havana, asked that ships be 
made ready in the event destruction of American property and lives 
took place. However, he assured his superior that they would not be 
needed at that time. Despite this assurance by Lee, the battleship 
Maine was ordered to Havana January 2h, 1898.
Public enthusiasm was at a fever pitch. Yellow journalists were 
reporting the Cuban news and when there was no news to report, they in­
vented some. Hundreds of prominent citizens were giving speeches for 
Cuban independence or annexation. Frye's every utterance had a Cuban 
complex. He spoke at many meetings of national organizations and 
enumerated Spanish abuses while calling for intervention. 50
5ii. Pratt, 0£. cit., p. 216.
55. Nation, February 11, 1897, p. U7.
56. Pratt, 0£. cit.. pp. 200-225.
57. Ib id .
58. Wisan, 0£. cit.. p. 230.
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In all the furor over Cuba, i’rye did not forget Hawaii. He ad­
dressed the Manufacturers Association of New York in February 1898, 
and urged those present to exercise their influence upon the Senate 
for annexation of Hawaii. If they did not, they surely would lose the
59Hawaiian market. In January, he had been quoted as wanting to 
"seize" Hawaii so that other interested nations could not annex them,^ 
and some Maine newspapers agreed with him.^
While the Maine lay in Havana harbor an almost melodramatic in­
cident occurred in the United States, the infamous de Lome Letter 
fiasco. In Maine, at least, people tended to blame no one but de Lome
for his indiscretion, but as time went on this attitude changed to in-
62volving Spain directly with the letter. No sooner had the de Lome 
furor subsided than the country went into a frenzy with the help of 
Heart's New York World. The Maine had blown up or had been blown up 
while it innocently lay at anchor!
At first the Maine explosion was greeted with mixed emotions. 
Senator aale, Frye's compatriot from Maine, was certain that it was an 
accident and voiced his disapproval of extremists who clamored for 
war.^”* Congressman Boutelle, who owned an interest in the Bangor Whig 
and Courier, sponsored a measure which offered condolences to the
59. Nation, February 3, 1898, p. 80.
60. K.J., January 6, 1898, p. 2.
61. Lewiston Journal, January 6, 1898; K.J., January 7, 1898; Bangor 
Whig and Courier, February 11, 1898, p. 2.
62. Bangor Whig and Courier, February 11, 1898, p. 1
63. Ibid., February 17, 1898, p. 1.
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families of those who lost their lives on the Maine. ^  Boutelle was 
opposed to war being one of the three that refused to vote for the 
declaration of war in April, He felt the pressure from his constit­
uents and publicly declared that "every Congressman had two or three 
newspapers in his district - most of them printed in red ink --  and
shouting for b l o o d . D e s p i t e  these pressures, the Whig pleaded for
66moderation and lamented the Congressional preparations for war.
Fpye, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had 
been close to the Cuban situation since 1895. Since 1896, the commit­
tee had been conducting investigations attesting to gain information 
about the insurgents. It continued its investigations by probing the 
cause of the Maine disaster. The committee had recently advocated 
intervention; its present investigation was essentially one to find 
further justification for intervention. Despite the fact that the 
official board of inquiry did not find Spain guilty of sabotage, Frye, 
as a member of the subcommittee questioned the witnesses with a manner 
suggesting that Spain had deliberately blown up the Maine. His sub­
sequent actions and public statements indicated that his knowledge of 
Cuban affairs was based solely on his interrogation of the witnesses 
as a member of the subcommittee. The results of the subcommittee's 
investigation were embodied in a resolution, Frye concurring, proposing
6l±. Ibid.
65. Boston Herald, October 23, 1898. Quoted in Rhodes, The McKinley 
and Roosevelt Administrations, p . 55.
66. B.W. and C., February 2h, 1898, p. 1
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the independence of Cuba.^
Shortly after the report was issued, Senator Proctor of Vermont 
returned to Washington from a trip to Cuba where he had observed the 
revolution first hand. Proctor's report depicting Spanish brutality 
and maladministration, served only to accentuate the already bellicose 
atmosphere of the country. A decade later one unidentifiable source 
alleged that Frye had literally dragged Proctor from the Senate cloak­
room to deliver this inflammatory speech. It was reported that Proctor 
did not want to give such a report because he realized the probable 
affects of such action.
On March 29, Frye and Senator Rawlins introduced a "startling 
resolution" which was only a portent of the pressures to be applied to 
President McKinley during the next three weeks in an attempt to get 
the President to declare war,
"Resolved, by the Senate and House of the Republic 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled 
that the independence of the Republic of Cuba be and 
the same is hereby declared, and the President is 
hereby authorized and directed to employ the land and 
naval forces of the United States of America to wage 
such a war to success. "68
Congressman Boutelle's Bangor Whig called this resolution ill-ad-
69vised and censured Frye for his jingoism. Theodore Roosevelt, how­
ever, congratulated Frye on his aggressiveness but directed Frye to
70"keep this note private."
67. Senate Reports, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. U58-5^9.
68. B.W. and C ., March 30, 1998, p. 1.
69. Ibid.. p. 1*.
70. biting Morison, ed., Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, (Cambridge:
85
As the days passed, Senator Frye continued to press for inter­
vention. Reportedly he and three others visited President McKinley to 
urge the President to ask the Senate for a declaration of war imrae-
71diately. Frye's belligerancy was not totally approved by his Maine 
constituents. Leading Portland businessmen sent Frye a letter en­
dorsing McKinley's policy of watchful waiting but the Senator continued
to assure the men that the Foreign Relations Committee would "do noth- 
72ing rashly.'" Less than a week later the Portland Press reminded 
Frye that the cause of the Maine's destruction was undetermined and 
the reasons for a war with Spain were ill-defined. Therefore, it 
urged a reconsideration of the whole attitude toward war
Business, in general, opposed war.^ This is a likely explanation 
why Senator Hale supported McKinley's policy, and clearly explains
nd
Mark Hanna's opposition to war. ' 3 Frye had consistently agreed with 
Hanna and other business leaders on Republican economic programs. It 
is difficult to explain, therefore, why Frye at this time should pur­
sue such an independent course. In Maine, Senators were still elected 
by the legislature which had traditionally been controlled by commer­
cial and industrial interests.
Harvard Press, 195l), Vol. 2, p. 806.
71. B.W. and C ., March 31, 1898, p. 2.
72. Ibid.. April 1, 1898, p. 1 .
73. Quoted in B.W. and C.. April 5, 1898, p. 2.
7k. Julius Pratt, Hispanic American Historical Review. "American 
Business and the Spanish American War," XlV, No. 2, pp. 161*-178.
75. Herbert Croly. Marcus Alonzo Hanna. (New York; MacMillan Co.. 
1923), p. 271*.
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On April ill, the Foreign Relations Committee's resolution demand­
ing independence or war was introduced by Frye; the Senate was in pand- 
emonium.' The Teller Amendment was quickly passed to discourage im­
perial designs of annexation but not without words from Frye who wish­
ed to leave the disposition of Cuba until a later date. It is clear
77that he desired annexation rather than the independence of Cuba. 1
Finally, April 19, 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution that
was tantamount to a declaration of war on Spain. Frye voted for the
resolution while Hale and Boutelle voted against it. The Whig praised
Boutelle for his courage in opposing such drastic action and praised
the "State of Maine" which it said had cut "a very creditable figure
throughout the Cuban controversy ... excepting ... the jingoistic
7fitendencies of Senator Frye." This was, indeed, mild talk compared to
Frye's speech of April 19, which spearheaded the final vote for war.
Lamenting the indecisiveness of Congress, he called for prompt action.
"I have been silent all through this discussion 
because I wanted action, now for God's sake let us 
do something to relieve those poor people in Cuba.
I believe that if we act now within ten days, Cuba 
will be free; provisions will be there for the starv­
ing and if not our guns will be thundering at Morro 
Castle."79
These are contradictory words from a man who, three years before, 
had risen to "true statesmanship" after the Allianca incident by saying:
76. London Times, April lit, 1898, 3:1. Quoted in Baily, op. cit.. 
p. 509.
77. Cong. Rec.. 55 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3791.
73. B.W. and C.. April 17, I898, p. It.
79. Ibid.. April 19, 1898, p. It.
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"I had almost hoped that Spain would assume 
such an arrogant and belligerent tone that it 
would be necessary for the United States to 
round out our possessions as they should be, 
and if we cannot buy it, I for one should like gq
to have an opportunity to acquire it by conquest."
Shortly after war was officially declared, Frye paid a visit to 
Secretary of the Navy Long, a Maine native, asking for vessels to pro­
tect the coast of Maine from Spanish ships. Long regarded this request
81as an imposition and apparently did not act on it. The request, in 
retrospect, seems little more than ridiculous since Spain's fleet was 
pathetically small and inefficient; besides, it had all it could 
handle in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Again, a rather obvious in­
consistency arises when one compares Frye's fear of attack and his 
earlier statement that Cuba would be free in ten days, implying that 
Spain was militarily destitute.
The atmosphere generated by the war had succeeded in raising 
Americanism to heights not unlike most wars. Hawaiian annexation had 
been blocked for years because in peacetime a more diverse public 
opinion was tolerated. Now, however, the time was right except for one 
obstacle, Thomas B. Reed. Reed had never liked Frye nor did he agree 
on many issues with him. Reed, as chairman of the Committee on Rules 
of the House, controlled the consideration of a Hawaiian annexation 
bill. For three weeks against unbearable pressures from both public
80. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
1931), p. 29.
81. Lawerence Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday, Journal of John D .
Long. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1923), p. 185.
8 8
O n
opinion and his Republican colleagues, Reed blocked this bill.1 
Finally on July 6, I898, nawaii was annexed and Frye rejoiced to see 
one of his long sought proposals become a reality. A  precedent for 
expansion beyond the continental boundaries had been established.
The "boy scout war" was short-lived. %  August the outcome was 
sure, if a doubt had ever existed. Would the United States follow the 
Hawaiian precedent by annexing Cuba and the Philippines? President 
McKinley appointed his peace commission in the middle of August. Three 
members of the Foreign Relations Committee were selected, Frye, Davis, 
and Gray. Whitelaw Reid, editor of the Mew York Tribune, and Secretary 
of State Day completed the commission. Only Senator Gray, a Democrat,
Q  O
was known to be an anti-imperialist.0-5
Frye was reluctant to serve as a peace commissioner and if he had 
known that Senator Davis preferred Theodore Roosevelt to him, he might 
never have gone to Paris.
Official negotiations began in Paris October 1, 1898, and the 
treaty was signed on December 10. Nearly a month was consumed discuss­
ing the delicate Cuban question. On October 31, the vexing and per­
plexing Philippine question came under discussion. United States 
policy regarding the Philippines had not been established by a formal 
statement. President McKinley had stated that he would accept no less
82. Pratt (1898), pp. 315-325.
83. N.Y.T., August 27, I898. Frye was labeled a jingo and an ex­
pansionist.
QU. Thomas Beer, Hanna, (New York: A. Knopf, 1929), p. 208.
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than Luzon.^
At first, Frye's position was vague. In an interview before going
to Paris he stated that Puerto Rico and the Ladrone Islands must be
annexed by the United States. To a question asking him if he would
demand more than Luzon and Manila he replied, "there are other islands
in the Philippines that are valuable. The commissioners can, you
86understand, exact whatever trade benefits they wish." After a meet­
ing with the other commissioners in President McKinley's office, he 
and Davis talked about dividing the islands; only Reid wished to take
ft 7the entire archipelago.0 At Paris, both Fiye and Davis joined Reid
88 ,in demanding the cession of the entire Philippine Islands. Why he 
changed his mind remains a mystery. It was, no doubt, this fact which 
helped to change President McKinley's original demand of just Luzon to 
demand that all the islands were to be taken (with the help of Divine 
Providence, of course).
The Spanish commissioners balked at American demands for the en­
tire Philippine Islands and negotiations broke down. At this juncture, 
Senator Frye made one of the most important moves of the entire de­
liberations. He sent a telegram to President Cleveland via Mr. A. A. 
Adee (State Department aide) informing him of the precariousness of the 
negotiations. He warned that Spain had already conceded all that her
85. Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 905-907.
86. Lewiston Journal, August 25 or 26, 1898, p. ?
87. Pratt, ojo. cit.. p. 332.
88. U.S. Foreign Relations, 1898, (Washingtons G.P.O., 1899), pp. 932- 
933 •
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people would possibly accept; so could not the United States offer 
Spain a slight inducement which would placate the Spanish people while 
gaining America's desired ends?
"Might we not agree to pay Spain from $10,000,000 
to $20,000,000 if thus a treaty could be secured?
If no treaty then war, a continued disturbance of 
business, an expenditure of a million dollars a day,
and further loss of l i f e-- If war is resumed, I
hope orders will be given to seize at once all of 
the Philippine Islands, also the Carolines.1'^
Two days later, Secretary of State John Hay called Frye to pro­
ceed with the negotiations along the lines proposed in Frye's telegram*
If money would save a treaty then use money but do not sacrifice na-
90tional honor were Hay's instructions . The remainder of the negotia­
tions proceeded on this basis. Spain, toward the end of the delibera­
tions, desired free entry into Philippine ports if the islands were to
be given to the United States. Frye emphatically opposed thisre-
. 91 quest.
B y the terms of the treaty Spain ceded the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, and Guam to the United States. Cuba was to become free from 
Spanish sovereignty. The final settlement provided that Spain receive 
$20,000,000 in exchange for the Philippines.^
The commissioners returned to the United States and were met with 
a mixed reception. After reading Frye's account of the proceedings in
89. Ibid., p. 939. Frye to Adee. October 30, 1898, Sunday midnight. 
(Author' s italics, my underlining).
90. Ibid.. Hay to Frye, November 1, 1898. i'he U.S. could not clan the 
Philippines by right of conquest since Manila was captured after the 
war ended.
91. Ibid., p. 962. Spain eventually gained a ten year guarantee of 
port privileges. Pratt, op. cit., p. 3l*0.
92. Pratt, op. cit., pi 3fe.---
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When the treaty was ratified on February 6, 1899, only two Republicans,
98Senator Hoar and Hale voted against it. Frye and Hale narrowly
99escaped a complete break on this issue.
The United States had broken with its traditional isolationism 
and had, briefly at least, entered the arena of power politics. Frye 
perfectly reflected this chauvinistic, expansionistic age and philos­
ophy.
98. Ibid., p. 358.
99.- Thomas B. Reed, even more irate at Frye and hi. s colleagues than 
Hale, resigned the Speakership of the House and retired permanently 
from politics because of his disgust with the treaty.
AN END OF AN ERA
Not much material of historical dependability is available about 
the personal and professional relationships of William P. Frye. It 
would be extremely hazardous, therefore, to draw from the material 
that is aval lable any definite conclusions regarding this side of 
Frye's career. However, the author feels that it is necessary to fill 
in a few of the obvious gaps and to attempt to place Frye in an his­
torical relationship with his colleagues and with their times.
Criticisms and compliments of Frye by his associates tended to 
follow party lines. His Republican friends apparently liked him and 
thought him amicable but the records fail to reveal that they consider­
ed him a party giant or even a great man. Chauncey Depew, Senator from 
New York and a friend of big business, described Frye as a remarkable 
man, always honest and frank in his personal relationships and a great 
legislator.'*' However, considering his long and undistinguished career 
such value judgments from Depew are of questionable validity.
Shelby Cullum described Frye as follows:
Frye held the respect of the people of his state 
to a greater degree than any other Maine statesman, 
except Blaine. As Chairman of the Committee on Com­
merce he was familiar with every question pertaining 
to rivers and harbors, the shipping interests, and 
the multitude of matters coming before the Committee....
It was his custom to report a bill from his Com­
mittees... and ask for its immediate consideration.
No one ever objected, and the bill went through as a 
meritorius measure without qiestion, on his word
Chapter VI
1. Chauncey Depew, My Memories of Eighty Years (New York: Scribners
1922), p. 178-180. ----------------  ------  *
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alone to the Senate.
Many of the positions Frye held were due to seniority but he 
filled them capably. He was elected president pro-tempore of the Sen­
ate three times, 1896, 1901, and 1907, a total of fifteen years ser- 
3
vice in that office. In addition, he served as president of the Sen­
ate for six years because of the death of Vice-President Garret Hobart 
in 1899 and the assassination of President McKinley in 1901. For his 
long and distinguished service as presiding officer, his colleagues 
presented him a loving cup "that he cherished until his death.
It is from his death notices that a more complete estimate of 
Frye can be drawn. Maine newspapers naturally eulogized him. One, in 
describing Frye's opposition to drinking, declared, "...not John B, 
Gough, or Sam Jones, or General Dow himself hold a nobler reoord in 
defense of prohibition than ... Frye. Senator Frye was one of the 
greatest men Maine ever reared."'’ Another paper emphasized that "the 
young men will miss him.... He aided a great many of them in securing 
lucrative positions.. and his own Lewiston papers carried front 
page headlines.^
It is not Maine newspapers, however, that record a mature and
2. Shelby Cullum, $0 Years of Public Service. (New York: A.C. McClurg 
and co., 1911), p. 3k5.
3. Charles Lingley, Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 7, p. 5l.
1*. Lewiston Journal. August 11, 1911, p. 1.
5. B.W. and C .. August 10, 1911, p. 1.
6. Bangor Commercial, August 12, 1911, p. 1 .
7* Lewiston Sun. August 9, 1911, p.l. Lewiston Journal. August 9, 1911,
P.  2.
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sensitive evaluation of Frye. The Nation, which had opposed Frye on a 
number of crucial issues in the past, conceded that he was a remarkable 
man, able and learned in diplomatic relations and in law, but "whose 
vision narrowed with the passing years ... the adjective great is not 
of those that suggest themselves in any review of the long, and in
g
several ways very useful, career recently ended."
Perhaps the Outlook described him best:
"Senator Frye may be described as belonging to 
the better of two divisions in which conservative 
leaders of a generation ago may be classed, he was 
not a petty politician and yet he was a politician 
in tiie main, rising sometimes to statesman like 
qualities and never becoming a mere tool of great 
interests. He was an indefatigable worker, a cap­
able speaker, and tested by recent standards, may 
be regarded as an ultra-conservative in all such 
matters as the protective tariff and the contr ol 
of corporations.
It can not be denied that Frye fitted this description. He did
not adapt to change easily. This conservatism coupled with his asso­
ciation with some of the more wealthy members of the "millionaires 
club", as the Senate was then known, caused him to be identified as one 
of these gentlemen in both wealth and ideas.^
It was David Grahm Phillips who presented to the American people 
their first shocking encounter with the entrenched special privilege to 
be found in American political institutions during the first years of 
the twentieth century. In 1905-1906, Phillips published a serial type 
expose of some members of the Senate entitled '^reason in the Senate.
8. Nation. August 17, 1911, p. 133.
9. Outlook. August 19, 1911, p. 857.
10. Frye apparently was anything but a wealthy man
9 6
Phillips assailed Chauncey Depew of New York, Nelson Aldrich of Rhode 
Island, and Arthur Gorman of Maryland. He alleged that these men were 
tools of big-business and were sacrificing the interests of the common 
people in favor of big-business concerns which they represented. One 
installment concentrated on "Fairbanks, Hale, and Frye."
Phillips' attack on -Frye was scathing although he admitted Frye's 
competence in some areas.^ Frye's ship subsidy programs were char­
acterized as grabs admissable only in the "club" because the Senate 
was the only legislative body not controlled by the common man. He
H
added, Hale and Frye have their senatorial seats from legislatures
ruled by railroad interests, therefore they are but tools of the Bos- 
12ton and Maine." Phillips concluded by denouncing Frye's motives for 
entering politics. He sits in Congress "for his dear friends in poli­
tics and social life. Those rich friends, being comfortable and in 
possession of more than their share, wonder at discontent, call con­
fiscation conservatism, and extol the virtue and piety of standput- 
ism."13
Phillips' charge that both Hale and Frye were "tools" of the Bos­
ton and Maine would be difficult to substantiate. Undoubtedly Frye 
was attentive to that railroad's best interests; he was a member of 
the board of directors of one of its branch lines from 1901 to l?!!.^
11. David Grahm Phillips, The Treason in the Senate (Stanford, 
California: Academic Reprints, P.0. Box 3003), p .  9U.
12. Ibid., p. 91;.
13. Ibid.
lit. Fortieth Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Maine 
Central Railroad, June 30, 1901. p. 2. '
9 7
William Chandler, Senator from New Hampshire, conducted investigations 
of the railroad and found that it controlled the legislatures of Maine, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire while it issued free passes to hun­
dreds of important officials in order to secure their support. Chandler 
often remarked that New Hampshire was controlled by a dictator and 
its name was the Boston and Maine.^ Frye was not a reformer at heart. 
Chandler asked for his support a number of times to curb the Boston and 
Maine and the general trend to consolidation by New England railroads. 
Frye shrugged off such requests by declaring that he was glad to say 
that he did not belong to the reformers "for generally they are only 
disgruntled politicians or assistant Democrats.
Actually, in the last analysis, Frye was more progressive than his 
colleague Hale. After 1901, Hale became increasingly unpopular in the 
country at-large because of his refusal to recognize the changing at­
mosphere of Washington politics. On the question of the popular elec­
tion of senators, Hale voted with other New England senators in oppo­
sition, while the "aged and infirm" Frye concluded that the people
were determined to have it and so expressed a willingness to go along 
17
with public sentiment.
From 1905 to 1911 Frye remained in the Senate but little of the 
old vigor remained. His wife had died and he was nearing the age of 
eighty. On August 8, 1911, having spent forty years as a member of 
Maine's congressional delegation, Frye died at his home in Lewiston,
15. Richardson, o£. cit., p. Ibid., pp. 617-625.
16. Ibid., p. 682i.
17. Boston Herald. August 11, 1911, p. 1
9 8
Maine. When notified of Frye's death, President Taft lamented, "the
Lord seems to be against the Republican party for that means another 
1 RDemocrat and at once." What Taft did not realize was that not 
Divine Providence but public sentiment was against the "old guard". 
Frye's death served only to emphasize the passing of a generation which 
had lived so comfortably with the inconsistencies of democracy in 
theory and plutocracy in practice.
18. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (New 
York: Farrar-Rinehart Go., 1939), Vol. 2, p . 623.
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